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ABSTRACT 
An increase in targeted violence incidents (TVIs), primarily active shooter events, at institutions 
of higher education (IHEs) has exposed gaps in campus security plan preparation and exercises.  
The purpose of this qualitative collective case study was to discover barriers to and best practices 
of universities and colleges conducting security preparedness activities for TVIs.  The theory that 
guided this study was vested interest theory which predicts how attitudes will influence behavior 
in a commitment to preparedness fundamentals.  The setting for this study was two institutions of 
higher education along the East Coast of the United States.  Data collection techniques included 
site documentation review, observation, and interviews of campus administrators, faculty, 
emergency managers, and senior campus police officials.  The three data types were triangulated 
and summarized for each of the five research questions (a-e).  I identified four themes from the 
interview data:  hindrances, recommendations, best practices, and vested interests.  The major 
barriers to security preparedness were lack of resource funding for dedicated preparedness staff 
and activities; apathy regarding campus security preparedness by administrators, staff faculty and 
students; multiple federal security preparedness guides; and the lack of requirements for robust 
security planning and exercises.  Major recommendations identified from this study include 
increased funding for campus security preparedness, IHE senior leadership must model the way 
for campus security preparedness, IHEs acquire campus security accreditation, and the transfer 
of IHE campus security preparedness oversight from the Department of Education (DOE) to 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).    
Keywords: preparedness, plans, security, exercises, colleges, universities, targeted 
violence incident (TVI), active shooter 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
An increase in targeted violence incidents (TVIs) in institutions of higher education 
(IHEs) has highlighted the need for more focus on security planning and campus security 
exercises.  While campus security preparedness has improved greatly over the last 50 years, the 
lack of federal or state requirements to engage in preparedness activities for TVIs has led to 
inadequate security plans and exercises.  There is a gap in the literature regarding best practices 
to build vested interest in security preparedness.  This qualitative collective case study helps to 
bridge that gap and contribute recommendations to improve campus security preparedness.  The 
research audience includes legislative representatives, federal agencies, campus security 
personnel, and higher education administrators with influence over college and university 
practices.  In this chapter I first provide a background of the topic, followed by a description of 
how this topic applies to myself.  Next are the problem and purpose statements, which are 
followed by the significance that this study may have on the research literature and the world at 
large.  Finally, the research questions designed to address these problems are listed. 
Background 
 As of 2015 there were 4,627 IHEs (public, private, 4-year, 2-year) that serve over 15 
million students and several million faculty, staff, and visitors annually (International 
Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, 2015; U.S. Department of Education, 
National Center for Education Statistics, 2015).  Over the last 25 years, there has been a steady 
rise in TVIs on college and university campuses in the U.S. (Kaminski, Koons-Witt, Thompson, 
& Weiss, 2010).  These acts may originate from planned terror attacks, revenge-motivated 
attacks, and/or random events, the number of which has increased in the United States and 
15 
 
around the world (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013b).  In his February 11, 2003, 
testimony before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States, FBI Director Robert 
Mueller, reported:  
Our investigations suggest that al-Qaeda has developed a support infrastructure inside the 
U.S. that would allow the network to mount another terrorist attack on U.S. soil.  
Multiple small scale attacks against soft targets-such as banks, shopping malls, 
supermarkets, apartment buildings, schools and universities, churches, and places of 
recreation and entertainment-would be easier to execute. (U.S. Department of Justice, 
2005, p. 62) 
The type of assailants and weapons that result in a TVI may vary along with the severity 
of the event (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013b).  The most commonly used 
weapon is a gun, but knives, bombs, gases, and fire may be used as well.  Types of assailants 
may vary from terrorists, unstable mentally ill individuals, gangs, disgruntled IHE community 
members, and individual criminals.  Types of active violence incidents include armed assault, 
armed attack, intrusion, deadly force incident, active shooter, targeted act of violence, and other 
similar attacks (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013b).   
Active shooter incidents constitute a large majority of the type of TVIs that have been 
perpetrated at colleges and universities over the last 40 years.  “An active shooter is an individual 
actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined space or other populated 
area, most often using firearms and following no pattern or method in the selection of victims” 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013b, p.2).  
Following the attacks on Columbine in 1999, the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. 
Department of Education teamed up to create the Safe School Initiative (Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, 
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Borum, & Modzeleski, 2004).  According to this study, the term targeted violence stems from 
the Secret Service’s Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP) to study individuals who have or 
have attempted to harm a prominent public official in the U.S. since 1949.  In the ECSP, the 
Secret Service defined targeted violence as “any incident of violence where a known or 
knowable attacker selects a particular target prior to their violent act” (Vossekuil et al., 2004, p. 
4).  FEMA expands this definition to include the location as a target as well as a person(s).  
FEMA does not include incidents that “just happened to occur” at that location (e.g., the result of 
gang or drug activity; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013b).   
 Recent research has focused on looking beyond active shooter events to include hybrid 
targeted violence (HTV).  Hybrid Targeted Violence (HTV) is another type of attack 
methodology in which there is an “intentional use of force to cause physical injury or death to a 
specifically identified population using multifaceted conventional weapons and tactics” 
(Frazzano & Snyder, 2014, p. 1).  HTV incidents can involve multiple scenarios, including one 
or more active shooters, and the use of fire, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and/or 
chemicals as weapons (Frazzano & Snyder, 2014).  The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
and the U.S. Secret Service are the two primary federal agencies focused on HTV research 
(Frazzano & Snyder, 2014).   
For the purposes of this discussion and unless otherwise specified, I will use the term 
targeted violence or targeted violence incident (TVI) to refer generally to acts of violence for 
which IHEs must prepare.  Whether it is an active shooter or a bombing, IHEs must strive to be 
ready for anything.   
Combining the data in Blair and Schweit (2014), Kaminski, Koons-Witt, Thompson, and 
Weiss (2010), Lenn (2014), and McIntire and Wexler (2015), the following is a list of  active 
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shooter events at U.S. IHEs between the years 1966 and 2015 with two or more fatalities or 
injuries:  In August, 1966, 16 killed and 32 wounded at the University of Texas; July, 1976, 
seven killed at California State University at Fullerton; November, 1991, five killed and one 
wounded at the University of Iowa (IA);  April, 1992, two killed at Indiana University (IN); 
December, 1992, two killed and four wounded at Simon’s Rock College (MA); August, 1996, 
three killed at San Diego State University (CA); September, 1996, one killed and 41 wounded at 
Pennsylvania State University (PA); in 1998, one killed and three injured at South Texas 
Community College (TX);  January, 2002, three killed and three wounded at the Appalachian 
School of Law (VA); October, 2002, three killed, at the University of Arizona Nursing College 
(AZ); 2003, one killed and two injured at Case Western Reserve University (OH); 2006, two 
killed at Shepherd University (WV); April, 2007, 32 killed and 17 wounded at Virginia Tech 
(VA); February, 2008, two killed at Louisiana Technical College (LA); February, 2008, six 
killed and 18 wounded at North Illinois University, (IL); 2008, two killed and one injured at 
University of Central Arkansas; 2010, three killed and three injured at University of Alabama 
(AL); 2012, one killed and seven injured at University of Pittsburgh Medical Center; April, 
2012, seven killed and three injured at Oikos University in Oakland, CA (Lenn, 2014); and in 
October, 2015, nine killed and nine injured at the Umpqua Community College (OR) (McIntire 
& Wexler, 2015).   
 These incidents have raised awareness to prevent deaths from TVIs overall, with a focus 
on active shooters on campus (Schafer, Heiple, Giblin, & Burruss, 2010).  King (2014) reported 
that following the active shooter incidents at Virginia Tech and North Illinois University, the 
number of IHEs with armed sworn officers nationwide showed small increases.  This flurry of 
activity and interest immediately following campus violence quickly gives way to a sense of 
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complacency leaving IHEs vulnerable to a myriad of potential threats (Goodman, 2009).  
Research by Seo, Torabi, Sa, and Blair (2012) indicated that even though most colleges have 
emergency plans in place, only 25% of campuses believed their students understood or were 
prepared to respond to a TVI.   
The general problem that I address is that we know little about how campuses respond to 
violence and even less about how different constituents groups on campus respond to a 
potentially violent incident.  Knowing the information would help us devise better plans 
for reacting to this type of problem as well as add to the literature on violence in 
educational settings. (Creswell, 2013, pp. 270-271)   
Even though many colleges and universities have a division of the institution focused on 
emergency preparedness, many recommendations made from federal agencies to increase 
preparedness have not been adopted (Thompson & Schlehofer, 2014).  According to federal 
agency data, only 52% of IHEs had drills for emergency response plans (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2013b).  Additionally, the respondents indicated that most of those plans 
were multipurpose and lacked significant depth for security incidents.  The core document to 
prepare and respond to a TVI is a security plan.  Even though awareness has grown since the 
TVIs at Virginia Tech and North Illinois University, the lack of overall crisis management plans 
is a major problem that impacts institutional operations, technology, and infrastructure (Wang & 
Hutchins, 2010).   
While there are limited federal legislative requirements for emergency response and 
evacuation procedures at IHEs, there are no specific legislative requirements for IHEs to have 
campus security plans or conduct exercises for TVIs (U.S. Department of Education, 2010).  
Overall federal guidance on exercises rests with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s 
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Federal Emergency Management Agency, which administers the Homeland Security Exercise 
and Evaluation Program (HSEEP).  While campus preparedness resource investments have 
increased over the last 20 years, only 31% of colleges and universities have increased funding for 
campus safety since 2007 (Schafer et al., 2010).  The Jeanne Clery Act requires the reporting of 
annual criminal statistics at IHEs to the U.S. Department of Education, but lacks comprehensive 
requirements for security plans and exercises at IHEs (Sokol, 2010).  The only requirement under 
the Clery Act that are mandated in the Code of Federal Regulations (34 CFR 668.46) is to 
disclose emergency response and evacuation procedures. The U.S. Department of Education, 
Office of Postsecondary Education (2011) interprets the Code of Federal Regulations (34 CFR 
668.46) as follows:  
This requirement is intended to ensure that an IHE has sufficiently prepared for an 
emergency situation on campus, has tested those procedures to identify and improve on 
weaknesses, and has considered how it will inform the campus community and other 
individuals, such as parents and guardians.  The Clery Act provides flexibility to IHEs in 
designing their tests and does not prescribe a particular type that must be used.  (p. 49-50) 
A sample procedures statement is provided in the U.S. Department of Education, Office of 
Postsecondary Education Handbook (2011), which links many other federal agency planning 
guidelines, but does not include them in the minimum requirements:  
The University’s Incident Manual includes information about Incident Teams, University 
operating status parameters; incident priorities and performance expectations; shelter-in 
place and evacuation guidelines; and local contingency and continuity planning 
requirements.  University Departments are responsible for developing contingency plans 
and continuity of operations plans for their staff and areas of responsibility.  The 
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University conducts numerous emergency response exercises each year, such as table top 
exercises, field exercises, and tests of the emergency notification systems on campus. (p. 
104) 
These numerous federal guidance documents for security preparedness are confusing and 
lack accountability of institutional performance.  As a result, IHEs have limited vested interest in 
adopting federal agency recommendations.  
Situation to Self 
 My primary motivation and worldview to conduct this study is the current vulnerability 
of IHEs to effectively respond to TVIs on a college or university campus.  My primary career 
path in the U.S. Coast Guard has been in contingency planning for security incidents and natural 
disasters.  In 2007, I was selected for advanced education in the U.S. Coast Guard and received 
Port Security Industry Training (PSIT).  PSIT is a unique opportunity for U.S. Coast Guard 
personnel to expand their knowledge of commercial port safety and security issues such as 
facility safety compliance, containerized or explosive handling operations, maritime 
transportation system recovery, and novel industrial processes.  My PSIT was completed at the 
North Carolina State Port Authority where I focused on gaining insight into senior management 
problem solving relative to federal regulations and external influences.  Additionally, I was 
assigned for several weeks at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency field office in 
Wilmington, North Carolina regarding government agency screening of foreign vessels to 
increase professional knowledge to regulate the maritime industry.  
 I have served as the International Oil Spill Coordination Division Chief at the U.S. Coast 
Guard Headquarters in the Office of Marine Environmental Response (MER) Policy where I 
developed the exercise frameworks for the 2015-2016 Arctic Council’s Agreement on 
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Cooperation in Pollution Preparedness and Response under U.S. Chairmanship.  As the MER Oil 
& Hazardous Substance Division Response Branch Chief from 2011-2013 following Deepwater 
Horizon, I revitalized the MER Program’s Response Resource Inventory, establishing the 
National Strike Force Center of Expertise, and completing a 10 year update of the guidelines for 
the U.S. Coast Guard Oil Spill Removal Organization Classification Program.  Other 
assignments in the U.S. Coast Guard include Chief, Contingency Planning Division, Sector 
North Carolina; Assistant Branch Chief, Marine Casualty and Analysis Branch, District Eight, 
New Orleans; and Chief, Port Safety and Security Branch, Marine Safety Office, Mobile.  I 
graduated from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in 1997 with a Bachelor of Science in Civil 
Engineering.  
 Currently, in addition to my role as Director of the U.S. Coast Guard’s District 5 North 
Region, I serve on the LANTAREA Incident Management and Assist Team (IMAT) as a 
Planning Section Chief (PSC).  The IMAT features alternating duty teams of approximately 25 
members each, trained in specific incident command roles who are available to deploy on 
approximately 12 hours’ notice.  The IMAT is a command control resource which can provide 
expert watch relief for extended command post operations and can further train and mentor 
personnel on the Incident Command System (ICS).  
 The three major incidents I have responded to or created national policy for in my 19 year 
career include 9/11 in 2001, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 
2010.  Each of these disasters could have had improved response efforts with more focus on 
contingency plans and exercises to increase preparedness beforehand.  
22 
 
 Finally, I am a father of two children who will attend college in the future.  Given my 
professional background and the apparent weaknesses among many campuses, I want my 
children to be safe at the institution of their choice.   
The philosophical assumption that led to my choice of research was epistemological 
(Creswell, 2013).  This assumption is focused on getting information from participants, such as 
institution security planners, security exercise participants, and institution administrative leaders 
who have a role in emergency preparedness.  Axiological assumption may play a role with 
potential bias from research subjects regarding the level of security preparedness at IHEs.  The 
expectation from the parents and the public in general is that the executive and legislative 
branches of government will create sufficient federal legislation and regulatory requirements to 
maintain the safety of students, faculty, and staff at IHEs.  The federal government has the 
responsibility of oversight of regulatory requirements in the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 
so that IHEs consistently meet the minimum federal requirements for student safety, whether the 
IHE is public or private, small or large.  However, bias should not impact the study to a large 
extent.  The methodological assumption should not be significant since a standardized system is 
in place from multiple federal agencies for guidance on campus security plans and exercises.   
Problem Statement 
 There is a lack of research regarding best practices for TVI security preparedness as well 
as how IHEs incorporate the varied and confusing federal agency guidance (e.g., Department of 
Education, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and Secret Service).  
According to the U.S. Department of Justice (2005), “There is little qualitative research on the 
response of college and university campuses to the threat of terrorist activity and no single entity 
serves as a clearinghouse for research, policy development, and information exchange” (p. 23). 
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Even if a security plan is in place, the literature suggests that most IHEs do not conduct exercises 
regularly or update their plans from exercise lessons learned.  Overall IHE compliance with 
nationally published federal agency guidelines in emergency preparedness with regard to having 
an institutional emergency plan has been reported at 96%, however, less than 10% of those 
routinely exercise the plan (Cheung, Basiaga, & Olympia, 2014).  A recent study indicated that 
even though most colleges have emergency plans in place, only 25% of campuses believed their 
students understood or were prepared to respond to a crisis (Seo et al., 2012).   
Without significant legislative changes by Congress to require implementation of security 
planning recommendations and the HSEEP, motivating all IHEs to incorporate all federal 
recommendations to improve preparedness is a Sisyphean task.  How and why are some IHEs 
independently vested to focus on preparedness?  Barring new legislative requirements, how can 
other IHEs with lesser standards and practices be compelled to improve their preparedness 
actions?  
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative collective case study is to discover barriers to IHEs’ 
implementation and maintenance of security preparedness for TVIs and to determine the most 
successful tactics to incorporate preparedness throughout all IHEs.  The theory guiding this study 
is vested interest theory which predicts that self-interested attitudes will influence behavior 
towards a commitment towards preparedness fundamentals (Miller, Adame, & Moore, 2013).  
The more a behavior or attitude is perceived to benefit ones’ self, the more a person will regard 
the behavior or attitude.  Vested interest theory is a centerpiece of current IHE security 
preparedness given the lack of federal or state requirements for security plans and exercises.  
Campus security preparedness is based on how invested IHE leadership, campus administrators, 
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and other personnel are in exercise security plans and ensuring they are properly updated.  Given 
the overall rarity of incidents of TVIs on IHEs, and the direct and indirect costs of preparedness 
as compared to other events and needs, some IHEs have a low vested interest in improving 
security preparedness. 
The setting of this research study was two IHEs on the East Coast of the U.S.  Data 
collection techniques included document analysis of institutional security plan documentation, 
observation of exercises or preparedness activities, and conducting field interviews of faculty, 
department chairs, and other campus representatives.  Research questions were developed to gain 
insight into the challenges and potential recommendations for increasing higher education 
preparedness to respond to a TVI. 
 The primary theoretical framework used in this qualitative collective case study is vested 
interest theory.  This theory is described by Miller, Adame, and Moore (2013):  
Essentially, vested theory concerns the hedonic relevance of a particular attitude-object in 
its capacity to have meaningful personal consequences for an attitude holder.  Hence, if 
an attitude object is hedonically relevant, that attitude will be highly invested, and act as a 
powerful predicator of outcome-relevant behavior. (p. 6)   
The more that campus administrators, senior faculty, and other critical response 
personnel become vested in overall preparedness, the more likely that security plans, robust 
exercise schedules, and other risk reduction measures will be implemented.  According to Snyder 
and Holder (2015), “Many students and professional educators would be surprised to find that 
investments and policies can be influenced by a desire to do ‘something’ rather than an ability to 
do the ‘right thing’” (p. 57).  Research has also shown that vested theory is an important factor in 
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how individuals can motivate each other and improve attitudes and behaviors (Johnson, Siegel, 
& Crano, 2014).  
Significance of the Study 
The significance of this study is that it could provide IHEs with a set of practical planning 
and exercise recommendations for TVIs by improving compliance with the HSEEP 
recommendations, the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965, and Title IV requirements.  The 
research is clear that TVIs occur on IHE campuses with increasing frequency.  When large scale 
TVIs occur on campus, as in Virginia Tech and North Illinois University in 2007 and 2008, 
appropriate and swift actions in accordance with the campus security plan by administrators, 
campus security, faculty, staff, and students can save lives.  The numerous individual 
institutional task force and committee reports on security preparedness must be dusted off, 
reviewed, and updated annually.  The goal of this qualitative collective case study is to increase 
preparedness, identify best practices, and ultimately to save lives during TVIs at IHEs.  
Research Questions 
Security preparedness guidance for IHEs from disparate federal agencies is extensive; 
however, the limited research indicates that security guidance is not consistently implemented 
across the country.  As a result, the theme of the following research questions is to discover 
which federal agency recommendations have been implemented and reasons why others have 
not.    
From this research, it may then be possible to develop recommendations to increase 
overall campus preparedness (U.S. Department of Education, 2010).  The following research 
questions helped develop interview questions to get a story from research participants:  (a) How 
do institutions integrate federal agency multiyear exercise guidance of various types of 
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exercises (workshop/seminar, tabletop, functional, and full scale) for the campus security plan?  
(b) How are exercises of the campus security plan measured for overall preparedness to respond 
to a large-scale active shooter incident with multiple student injuries and loss of life?  (c) How 
are previous TVI exercise lessons used in follow-on exercises or updates to a campus security 
plan?  (d) How can the attitudes and behaviors of faculty, staff, and administrators consistently 
be focused on investing in active shooter overall campus preparedness? (e) Would new 
legislation that centralized federal agency IHE security oversight, established across the board 
requirements for campus security plans and exercises, and targeted resource support improve 
campus preparedness? 
Definitions 
1. After Action Report (AAR) – “The AAR summarizes key exercise-related evaluation 
information, including the exercise overview and analysis of objectives and core 
capabilities” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c, glossary-1). 
2. Active Shooter – An active shooter is “an individual actively engaged in killing or 
attempting to kill people in a confined space or other populated area, most often using 
firearms and following no pattern or method in the selection of victims” (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2013b, p. 2).  
3. Best Practices – “Best practices are peer-validated techniques, procedures, and solutions 
that prove successful and are solidly grounded in actual experience in operations, 
training, and exercises” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c, glossary-1). 
4. Drill – “A drill is a coordinated, supervised activity usually employed to validate a 
specific operation or function in a single agency or organization.  Drills are commonly 
used to provide training on new equipment, develop or validate new policies or 
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procedures, or practice and maintain current skills” (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2013c, glossary-3). 
5. Exercise – “An exercise is an instrument to train for, assess, practice, and improve 
performance in prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery capabilities in a 
risk-free environment.  Exercises can be used for testing and validating policies, plans, 
procedures, training, equipment, and interagency agreements; clarifying and training 
personnel in roles and responsibilities; improving interagency coordination and 
communications; improving individual performance; identifying gaps in resources; and 
identifying opportunities for improvement” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2013c, glossary-3).  
6. Exercise Planning Team – “The exercise planning team is responsible for the successful 
execution of all aspects of an individual exercise.  The planning team determines exercise 
objectives and core capabilities, creates a realistic scenario to achieve the exercise 
objectives, and develops documents to guide exercise conduct and evaluation.  The 
planning team’s organization and management principles should include clearly defined 
roles and responsibilities and a manageable span of control” (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2013c, glossary-4).  
7. Exercise Program Management – “Exercise program management is the process of 
overseeing a variety of individual exercises and supporting activities sustained over time.  
An effective exercise program helps whole community stakeholders maximize efficiency, 
resources, time, and funding by ensuring that individual exercises are part of a 
coordinated, integrated approach to building, sustaining, and delivering core capabilities” 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c, glossary-4).  
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8. Full Scale Exercise (FSE) – “FSEs are typically the most complex and resource-intensive 
type of exercise.  They involve multiple agencies, organizations, and jurisdictions and 
validate many facets of preparedness.  FSEs often include many players operating under 
cooperative systems such as the Incident Command System or Unified Command” (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013c, glossary-5).  
9. Functional Exercise (FE) – “Functional exercises are designed to validate and evaluate 
capabilities, multiple functions and/or sub-functions, or interdependent groups of 
functions.  FEs are typically focused on exercising plans, policies, procedures, and staff 
members involved in management, direction, command, and control functions.  In FEs, 
events are projected through an exercise scenario with event updates that drive activity at 
the management level.  An FE is conducted in a realistic, real-time environment; 
however, movement of personnel and equipment is usually simulated” (U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, 2013c, glossary-5).  
10. Homeland Security Academic Advisory Council (HSAAC) – was established to provide 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security with advice and recommendations “on 
matters related to homeland security and the academic community, including:  academic 
research and faculty exchange; homeland security academic programs; campus resilience; 
international students; student and recent graduate recruitment; and cybersecurity” (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 6) 
11. Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) – “HSEEP is a program 
that provides a set of guiding principles for exercise programs, as well as a common 
approach to exercise program management, design and development, conduct, 
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evaluation, and improvement planning” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c, 
glossary-5).  
12.  Hybrid Targeted Violence (HTV) – “intentional use of force to cause physical injury or 
death to a specifically identified population using multifaceted conventional weapons and 
tactics” (Frazzano & Snyder, 2014, p. 1) 
13. Incident Command System (ICS) Protocol – “A system adopted by the federal 
government for all hazards planning to identifying response roles of government and 
private emergency responders” (U.S. Department of Education, 2010, p. 9). 
14. National Incident Management System (NIMS) – “The NIMS standard was designed to 
enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a 
single, comprehensive system for incident management.  It is a system mandated by 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) that provides a consistent, 
nationwide approach for Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial governments; the 
private sector; and nongovernmental organizations to work effectively and efficiently 
together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of 
cause, size, or complexity” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c, glossary-7).  
15. Non-Sworn Officer – “A campus law enforcement or security department employee who 
acts as a first responder and whose principal responsibility is campus security and public 
safety” (International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, 2015, p. 
81) 
16. Seminar – “Seminars generally orient participants to, or provide an overview of, 
authorities, strategies, plans, policies, procedures, protocols, resources, concepts, and 
ideas.  As a discussion-based exercise, seminars can be valuable for entities that are 
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developing or making major changes to existing plans or procedures.  Seminars can be 
similarly helpful when attempting to gain awareness of, or assess, the capabilities of 
interagency or inter-jurisdictional operations” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2013c, glossary-10).  
17. Sworn Campus Officer – “An agency employee conferred with general police powers in 
furtherance of his/her employment with the agency, including the ability to make a full-
custody arrest” (International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, 
2015, p. 83)  
18. Table Top Exercise (TTX) – “A TTX is typically held in an informal setting intended to 
generate discussion of various issues regarding a hypothetical, simulated emergency.  
TTXs can be used to enhance general awareness, validate plans and procedures, rehearse 
concepts, and/or assess the types of systems needed to guide the prevention of, protection 
from, mitigation of, response to, and recovery from a defined incident.  Generally, TTXs 
are aimed at facilitating conceptual understanding, identifying strengths and areas for 
improvement, and/or achieving changes in attitudes” (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2013c, glossary-11).  
19. Targeted violence- “Targeted violence refers to any incident of violence where the 
location was deliberately selected and not simply a random site of opportunity and where 
the perpetrator selected a target before the incident.  For example, incidents where the 
attack ‘just happened to occur’ at that location, such as consequences of gang or drug 
activity, would not be included” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013b, p. 2).    
20. Training and Exercise Plan (TEP) – “The TEP is the foundation document guiding a 
successful exercise program.  The TEP articulates overall exercise program priorities and 
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outlines a schedule of training and exercise activities designed to meet those priorities” 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c, glossary-11). 
21. Training and Exercise Planning Workshop (TEPW) – “A TEPW is usually conducted to 
create a Multi-year TEP.  At a TEPW, stakeholders work together in a collaborative 
workshop environment to identify and set exercise program priorities based on core 
capabilities.  Based on these program priorities, TEPW stakeholders develop a multiyear 
schedule of specific training and exercises” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2013c, glossary-11). 
Summary 
  This qualitative collective case study was necessary to fill a gap in the literature and to 
reduce the risks of future incidents of TVIs at IHEs.  The collective case study approach was 
chosen due to the analysis of a real life situation of unusual interest.  The key element that was 
explored was what can be done to improve IHEs’ consistent vested interest in implementing 
federal agency guidance on security preparedness given that there are virtually no legal mandates 
to do so.  My professional experiences in the U.S. Coast Guard have shown me the results of 
gaps in response plans and effective exercise programs as in 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and 
Deepwater Horizon.  I have also experienced the immense benefits of effective planning and 
exercise programs that supported actual incident solid decision making, effective 
communications, and responsible use of resources.  I used my expertise in security contingency 
planning and exercises to conduct this research study and to develop recommendations to 
improve safety and security for all IHEs.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Overview 
 An increase in TVIs at IHEs has highlighted the lack of preparation to prevent and 
respond to such acts of violence on college campuses.  Furthermore, the research literature 
regarding the readiness of IHEs to effectively respond to TVIs is significantly lacking.  IHE 
plans and exercises follow federal government planning and exercise guidance, however, they 
need more focus and actual implementation.  This chapter contains the theoretical framework 
which guides this study.  This is followed by an extensive review of the literature including the 
history, demographics, legislation, federal and state guidance for security preparedness, security 
planning and exercises, IHE security accreditation, and challenges and supplements to security 
preparedness.  
Theoretical Framework 
The primary theoretical framework used in this qualitative collective case study is 
vested interest theory.  Miller et al. (2013) stated, “Vested theory concerns the hedonic 
relevance of a particular attitude-object in its capacity to have meaningful personal 
consequences for an attitude holder” (p. 6).  The more invested campus administrators, faculty, 
and other critical response personnel become in overall preparedness, the more likely that 
robust security plans and exercises will be implemented regularly. 
Related Literature 
History of Targeted Violence Incidents at IHEs 
Significant active shooter events have occurred on college campuses with multiple deaths 
and injuries to students, faculty, and staff.  Table 1 compiles data for the active shooter events at 
IHEs since 1966 in which the number of fatalities or injured was two or greater.  Figure 1 
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illustrates the gradual increase in numbers of fatalities and injured, particularly in the last 10 
years.  Blair and Schweit (2014) noted that the locations with the higher casualty counts tend to 
be educational facilities (e.g., Virginia Tech, Sandy Hook Elementary, Northern Illinois 
University).  Note, Umpqua Community College had only one unarmed security guard (i.e., a 
non-sworn officer) or the entire campus (McIntire & Wexler, 2015).   
   
Table 1  
 Active Shooter Events at IHEs from 1966 to 2015  
 
Year Location Fatalities Injured 
1966 University of Texas (TX) 16 32 
1976 Cal State at Fullerton (CA) 7 0 
1991 University of Iowa (IA) 5 1 
1992 Indiana University (IN) 2 0 
1992 Simon’s Rock College (MA) 2 4 
1996 San Diego State University (CA) 3 0 
1996 Penn State (PA) 1 41 
1998 South Texas Community College (TX) 1 3 
2002 Appalachian School of Law (VA) 3 3 
2002 University of Arizona School of Nursing (AZ) 3 0 
2003 Case Western Reserve University (OH) 1 2 
2006 Shepherd University (WV) 2 0 
2007 Virginia Tech (VA) 32 17 
2008 Louisiana Technical College (LA) 2 0 
2008 Northern Illinois University (IL) 6 18 
2008 University of Central Arkansas (AR) 2 1 
2010 University of Alabama (AL) 3 3 
2012 University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (PA) 1 7 
2012 Oikos University (CA) 7 3 
2013 Santa Monica College (CA) 5 4 
2015 Umpqua Community College (OR) 9 9 
Note. Includes only shootings on campus with two or more killed or injured (Blair & Schweit, 
2014; Frosch, Kumar, & Lazo, 2015; Kaminski, Koons-Witt, Thompson, Weiss, 2010; McIntire 
& Wexler, 2015). 
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Figure 1.  Active Shooter Events at IHEs from 1966 to 2015. 
 
 HTV attacks are less common in U.S. schools than strict active shooter events, but still 
occur.  The Bath Township Michigan School Massacre in 1927 involved firearms, bombs, and 
fire as weapons, as did the attack at the Olean New York High School in 1974.  Frazzano and 
Snyder (2014) refer to the two most horrific events at primary and secondary schools in the U.S. 
as examples of HTV attacks.  In 1999, two students from Columbine High School used guns, 
IEDs, and fire to kill 12 students and one teacher and injure 23 (Kohn, 2001).  In 2012, the 20 
year old son of a kindergarten teacher at Sandy Hook Elementary School first killed his mother 
in their home, then went to the school using ambush and breaching tactics to kill 20 children and 
six adults with an assault rifle and two pistols (Vogel, Horwitz, & Fahrenthold, 2012).  In 2006, a 
former graduate student at the University of North Carolina Wilmington ran his SUV into a 
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lunchtime crowd injuring nine people (North Carolina Department of Justice, 2008).  Federal law 
enforcement officials indicated the student was motivated to conduct the act of violence as 
retribution for the treatment of Muslims (North Carolina Department of Justice, 2008).    
 Active shooter events or HTV attacks at schools are not just an American problem, it is a 
worldwide problem.  One of the most violent attacks took place in Beslan, Russia on September 
3, 2004.  This small community of 40,000 was the location where 49 terrorists entered a school 
at roughly 9:00 am local time and took 1,181 hostages (Blair, Nichols, Burns, & Curnutt, 2013).  
Minimal to no contingency plans were in place for this type of hostage situation.  In the end, 330 
hostages were killed and 770 injured (Blair et al., 2013).  This horrible incident remains one of 
the deadliest attacks at a K-12 school in the world.   
 The events of September 11, 2001 changed Americans’ perspectives regarding their 
vulnerability to targeted violence from terrorism or criminal activity.  It seems that the threats 
from within, by students on our own campuses, are ones we are still struggling to manage.  Since 
the 2007 Virginia Tech and 2008 North Illinois University shootings, numerous changes and 
investments in campus security have occurred (Violino, 2010).  These incidents have raised 
awareness and motivated a call to action to prevent student deaths from shootings on campus 
(Schafer et al., 2010); however, historically a sense of complacency has returned, leaving a 
campus population vulnerable to a myriad of potential security violations, internal and external 
(Goodman, 2009).  According to Snyder and Holder (2015),  
Accurate predictions of when and where the next shooter event will occur are virtually 
impossible.  However, predictions can be made with absolute certainty that active shooter 
and hybrid targeted violence events will continue to occur in schools, workplaces, 
shopping centers, and other public gathering places due to their ‘soft target’ status. (p. 58)   
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While these latest campus shooting incidents changed the landscape of safety and security in 
higher education, the question remains, is it enough?  Are IHEs prepared to prevent and respond 
to the next incident?  With sufficient planning and preparation, students, faculty, and staff should 
feel safe without being alarmed on a daily basis.  
Demographics of Targeted Violence Incidents at IHEs  
 The demographics of IHEs are very different based on size of the student population, 
location to local emergency management resources, education programs, geographic location, 
and layout of individual campuses (including satellite campuses).  IHEs represent a broad range 
of student activities beyond the traditional academic buildings, including student housing, 
recreational buildings, student athletic complexes, and many more entities specific to each 
institution (U.S. Department of Education, 2010).  According to the U.S. Department of 
Education (2010), “These structural and environmental characteristics pose challenges for access 
control, monitoring movements, defining boundaries for facilities and grounds, standardizing 
procedures, decision making processes, and prioritizing resource allocation” (p.1).  IHEs are 
among a compelling list of soft targets for potential targeted violence by an active shooter, 
bombing, or other HTV modality (Snyder & Holder, 2015).  Despite this, one estimate by United 
Educators Insurance indicates that less than 30% of IHEs had a threat assessment prior to the 
Virginia Tech shootings in 2007 (Hoover, 2008).   
 Security risks on campuses continue to rise.  The figure below from Drysdale, 
Modzeleski, and Simons (2010) illustrates that while the IHE student population far exceeded the 
number of violent incidents on campus from the 1960s to 1980s, the number of incidents has 
since equaled or exceeded the number of students.  Hughes and White (2008) reported that over 
71,621 acts of criminal behavior, including 15 murders, occurred on college and university 
37 
 
campuses in 2004.  While Sattler, Larpenteur, and Shipley (2011) reported that 104 murders 
occurred between 2005 and 2007 on public and/or private 4-year campuses.   
 
 
Figure 2.  Increased Violence at Universities and Colleges.  Adapted from “Campus attacks: 
TVIs affecting institutions of higher education,” by D. A. Drysdale, W. Modzeleski, and A. B. 
Simons, 2010, U. S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Safe and 
Drug-Free Schools, U.S. Department of Education, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Washington D.C.  
 
 
 
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in conjunction with Texas State University, 
compiled data on active shooter incidents between 2000 and 2013 (Blair & Schweit, 2014).  
Note, that for the purposes of their study, Blair and Schweit (2014) did not include shootings 
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related to gang or drug violence or other shootings in which the public was not in danger.  Figure 
2 depicts the number of active shooter incidents, without regard to location, between 2000 and 
2013 (Blair & Schweit, 2014).   Figure 3 below depicts percentages of active shooter events in 
different location types between 2000 and 2013 (Blair & Schweit, 2014).  Motivations for active 
shooter incidents are extremely varied ranging from personal problems, such as disputes with 
employers or spouses/significant others, to varied levels of mental illness, perceived injustices, 
or a deadly mixture of any or all of these issues (Blair et al., 2013).  Commercial areas are by far 
the most common sites for active shooter incidents, with 46%, but education settings are the 
second most common at 24% (Blair & Schweit, 2014).    .    
39 
 
 
Figure 3.  Characteristics of active shooter incidents between 2000 and 2013.  Adapted from “A 
study of active shooter incidents, 2000 – 2013,” by J. P. Blair and K. W. Schweit, 2014, 
Copyright 2014 by Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S. 
Department of Justice, Washington D.C.  
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Figure 4.  Location categories of active shooter incidents between 2000 and 2013.  Adapted from 
“A study of active shooter incidents, 2000 – 2013,” by J. P. Blair and K. W. Schweit, 2014, 
Copyright 2014 by Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S. 
Department of Justice, Washington D.C.  
 
 In the New York Police Department’s analysis of active shooter incidents, Kelly (2012) 
further limits the DHS definition of active shooter to “include only those cases that spill beyond 
any intended victim to others” (p. 1).  Less than 2% of active shooter incidents were carried out 
by more than one person, less than 3% were carried out by women, and 36% involved more than 
one weapon (Kelly, 2012).  The United States has the highest level of active shooter incidents 
with 271 between 1966 and 2012.  Internationally, the next highest number of active shooter 
incidents during the same time period was in Canada with eight, while only five other countries 
witnessed no more than two incidents each (Kelly, 2012).   
 Despite the long list of horrifying incidents listed above, research into targeted violence is 
limited due to their low frequency of occurrence at IHEs in this country.  The demographic data 
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of actual incidents is important to recognize.  While this is a small percentage of the population, 
the number of people killed or wounded could have been prevented or lessened with better 
security preparedness.  Another report completed by the Secret Service, U.S. Department of 
Education, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (Drysdale et al., 2010) provided additional 
insights into TVIs at IHEs from 1990-2008: 
Incidents were identified in 42 states and the District of Columbia, with 57 % (n=155) of 
the incidents affecting IHEs located in only ten states, eight of which are among the 10 
states with the most IHEs.  The majority of incidents affected IHEs designated as 4-year 
institutions (84 %, n=228), followed by 2-year institutions (14 %, n=38), postsecondary 
vocational/technical schools (1 %, n=4), and those identified as post-graduate only (1 %, 
n=2).  In all, incidents affected 218 distinct campuses. (p. 11) 
The report described lethality of the assault was based on the use of deadly force with a weapon.  
These statistics demonstrate that the states with the highest numbers of students in four-year 
IHEs have the highest percentages for violence.  Overall active shooter incidents from 2000-
2010 data have seen a steady increase from one in 2000 to 21 in 2010 (Blair et al., 2013).  A total 
of 29 events occurred at schools over the 10 year period and 14 at a public venue (Blair et al., 
2013).  This research clearly shows the increased vulnerability of schools for targeted violence.  
The statistics are staggering in the aggregate and the need for more emphasis on campus security 
at colleges and universities is evident in order to prevent, respond, and mitigate the damage of 
these events.   
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Transformation of Security Preparedness in Middle and High Schools  
 Public education in K-12 grade levels for security preparedness has increased over the 
last 40 years, while the overall higher education system has not made significant increases to 
security preparedness.  For example, in the 1970s the number of full time police officers in 
schools was less than 100, but now has increased to over 17,000 (Madfis, 2014).  One study 
showed that over 60% of teachers at suburban middle and high schools reported having armed 
police officers in the schools (Madfis, 2014).  Another major change in public education has 
been the significant increase in security cameras in middle and high schools (Madfis, 2014).  
Less than 20% of high schools had security cameras prior to 1990 while over 55% reported 
having cameras in 2005 (Madfis, 2014).   
 A significant investment in police officers and security cameras occurred at public high 
schools.  Additionally, many school buildings have been adapted with electronic locks and 
consolidated entry and exits.  According to Madfis (2014), “Typically affluent communities 
prefer these environmental designs (as well as surveillance through police and cameras) to the 
daily use of metal detectors and random weapons searches” (p. 13).  Schools with high violence 
conditions have more invasive security preparedness and hands-on checking of students for guns, 
knives, and other weapons.  Public middle and high schools have responded to the threat of TVI 
incidents through a variety of preparedness activities incorporating drills for active shooters, 
increased numbers of police officers on campus, and cameras.  
Legislation Regarding Targeted Violence Incidents at IHEs  
The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) included a framework of ensuring that IHEs 
meet federal guidelines in order to receive federal funding (U.S. Department of Education, 
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Office of Postsecondary Education, 2011).  The HEA Act of 1965 had limited language on 
establishing requirements for student safety.   
 During the Vietnam War Era in the late 1960s and 1970s, protests on college campuses 
occurred frequently.  In May of 1970, a National Guard contingent was dispatched to assist in 
keeping order at Kent State University (Adamek & Lewis, 1973).  The National Guard 
confrontation with Kent State University protestors resulted in the death of four students and 
injuries to 10 others (Adamek & Lewis, 1973).  Interpretation of the law by state governments 
provided a relief to IHEs in protecting students prior to the 1980s.  Colleges and universities 
were primarily responsible for the security of property on campus (Lake, 2007).  However in 
1983, significant changes occurred with the court decision in Mullins v. Pine Manor College:  
Mullins v. Pine Manor College established for the first time that campuses also have 
duties to use reasonable care to protect not only property but also students and other 
people from foreseeable danger.  The court ruled against Pine Manor, finding that the 
college owed the student a legal duty to use reasonable care to prevent foreseeable 
dangers on campus. (Lake, 2007, p. 3)  
This decision increased requirements for controlling overall security and crime on higher 
institutions’ properties.  Mullins v. Pine Manor College had impacts across colleges and 
universities and started to end the isolated position of many administrators regarding the scope of 
higher education student security responsibilities (Lake, 2007).  General business-liability law 
application to higher education campuses was a fundamental change to how security of students 
would have to be addressed by college and university administrators.    
 Congress amended the HEA of 1965, entitled the Crime Awareness and Campus Security 
Act of 1990 (Title II of Public Law 101-542), also known as the Clery Act (U.S. Department of 
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Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, 2011).  The Clery Act was named after Jeanne 
Clery, a student at Lehigh University, who was raped and killed in her dorm in 1986.  This Act 
requires that faculty, students, and other higher education institution employees be notified when 
an immediate threat to public safety is detected.  This legislation linked safety and security 
requirements for IHEs to student financial assistance at Title IV schools.  Title IV institutions are 
any colleges or universities, private or public, that have signed Program Participation 
Agreements (PPAs) with the U.S. Department of Education that administer financial assistance 
on behalf of the agency (U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, 
2011).  Types of financial assistance included under this Title IV provision are Pell Grants, 
Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants (FSEOGs), Federal Work-Study 
Programs, Federal Perkins Loans, Direct Loan Programs, and the Leveraging Educational 
Assistance Partnership (LEAP) Programs.  All requirements of the Clery Act must be met in 
order for the Secretary of Education to approve an institution’s PPA, and therefore to receive 
funding (U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, 2011).  Failure to 
comply with the Clery Act can lead to the reduction or removal of student financial aid funding 
and civil penalties (Lenn, 2014).  This provision of the Clery Act provides very generic 
requirements with regards to security preparedness, but with significant ramifications for non-
compliance.   
 The Higher Education Act of 1965, which had been amended to the Crime Awareness 
and Campus Security Act of 1990 (Title II of Public Law 101-542) or the Clery Act, was 
reauthorized and expanded by Congress in 2008 and renamed to the Higher Education 
Opportunity Act (HEOA) of 2008.  The HEOA increased campus security requirements, as noted 
by Kennedy (2011) to, “immediately notify the campus community upon the confirmation of a 
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significant emergency or dangerous situation involving an immediate threat to the health or 
safety of students or staff occurring on the campus” (p. 22).  The HEOA of 2008, as promulgated 
in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), 34 CFR 668.46 (Cornell Law Library, 2015), requires 
IHEs to submit an annual security report which must include the following: 
1. Annual crime statistics, 
2. policies for timely reporting of crimes or emergencies, 
3. policies regarding security of and access to campus facilities, 
4. policies regarding campus law enforcement, 
5. list of programs designed to enhance students’ and employees’ knowledge of campus 
security procedures, 
6. list of programs to inform the campus community about the prevention of crimes, 
7. policies regarding criminal activity involving students at off campus facilities, 
8. policies regarding alcohol and illegal drugs, 
9. description of any substance abuse education programs, 
10. policy statement regarding sexual assault programs and procedures to follow after a sex 
offense occurs, 
11. statement regarding location of law enforcement information, 
12. policy statement regarding emergency response and evacuation procedures, and 
13. policy statement regarding missing student notification procedures.   
 The requirement most relevant to this study is the policy statement regarding the 
emergency response and evacuation procedures.  Under this requirement, the institution must 
document the following: 
1. List the procedures used to confirm a threat; 
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2. list the procedures of notification 
a. List the person(s) or organization(s) responsible for carrying out the notification 
b. Determine what part of the campus community to notify 
c. List the procedures regarding the notification of entities outside the campus 
community; 
3. list the procedures to test the emergency response and evacuation procedures; 
4. perform a test of the emergency response and evacuation procedures at least once per 
calendar year; and 
5. for each test, document description of the exercise, the date, time, and whether it was 
announced or unannounced.   
 While these requirements are minimal at best, the Department of Education has the power 
to levy fines if not met.  IHEs who fail to implement these minimum requirements to test 
emergency response and notification procedures are subject to civil penalties from the 
Department of Education of $27,500 per violation of the HEOA of 2008.  One of the largest such 
fines ever levied against an institution was $357,000 for violations of the HEOA of 2008 
surrounding the death of a student at Midwestern University (National Association of College 
and University Business Officers, 2008).  Numerous violations were noted by the Department of 
Education including failing to maintain a campus crime log, failure to include adequate policy 
statements in the annual security report, and failure to disclose campus crime statistics (National 
Association of College and University Business Officers, 2008).   
Federal Guidance for IHE Security Preparedness 
Under the HEOA of 2008 and with specific requirements in the Code of Federal 
Regulations 34 CFR 668.46, the U.S. Department of Education is the primary federal agency 
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with guidance regarding security preparedness at IHEs (Cornell Law Library, 2015).  Higher 
education campuses have not experienced the massive transformation of security preparedness 
regulations post 9/11 as seen in airports, ports, and other modes of travel as required by the 
federal government.  For example, the government took over control of airport security from the 
private sector at the majority of U.S. airports, yet there are only limited federal regulations 
enforcing safety and security preparedness on IHEs.   
 Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, FEMA developed a guide for IHEs to 
bolster their disaster plans (for both natural and man-made), with an emphasis on safety and 
security (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003).  FEMA developed these guidelines to 
develop “disaster-resistant” universities based on the experiences of six universities that 
collaborated, with the assistance of federal grants, to become more “disaster-resistant.”  The 
participating institutions include Tulane University in New Orleans, University of Alaska 
Fairbanks, University of California Berkeley, University of Miami, University of North Carolina 
at Wilmington, and the University of Washington in Seattle (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2003).  According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (2003): 
This document is both a how-to guide and distillation of the experiences of six 
universities and colleges across the country that have been working over the past several 
years to become more disaster-resistant.  It complements the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) State and Local Mitigation Planning how-to guides that 
provide planning guidance for creating and implementing a hazard mitigation planning 
process . . . This guide provides basic information designed for institutions just getting 
started as well as concrete ideas, suggestions, and practical experiences for institutions 
that have already begun to take steps to becoming more disaster-resistant. (p. III) 
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The guide is an additional supplement to millions of dollars awarded to IHEs from 1993-2003 
for disaster response (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003).  The guide focuses on 
four phases of becoming a “disaster-resistant” university:  (a) organizing resources, (b) hazard 
identification and risk assessment, (c) developing the mitigation plan, and (d) adoption and 
implementation (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003).  This guide is a foundational 
element for IHE security preparedness and referenced numerous times in the literature. 
 The U.S. Department of Education sets guidelines for emergency planning for IHEs    
(U.S. Department of Education, 2007), and in 2010 published the “Action Guide for Emergency 
Management in Higher Education,” which has three primary purposes:  (a) to provide an 
overview of emergency management, (b) to provide a resource for developing emergency 
management plans, and (c) to provide an evaluation tool for campus emergency management 
programs (U.S. Department of Education, 2010).  Additionally, this “Action Guide . . .” 
recommended IHEs utilize two other cornerstone documents for emergency preparedness (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2010):  (a) “Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for 
Schools and Communities,” published by the U.S. Department of Education (2007),  and (b) 
“Building a Disaster-Resistant University,” published by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA; 2003).  According to the U.S. Department of Education (2010), “This action 
guide is not meant to prescribe exactly how emergency management should be practiced; rather, 
each higher education institution should decide for itself the best way to prepare to meet its own 
unique set of needs” (p. 3).   
 In 2013, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2013c) published the Homeland 
Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) that “provides a set of guiding principles for 
exercise programs, as well as a common approach to exercise program management, design and 
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development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning” (p. 1).  HSEEP guidelines were 
established to improve national preparedness for federal, state, and local emergency responders 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c).  HSEEP uses standard terminology and best 
practices for a framework of exercise management.  The biggest benefit to IHEs for using the 
HSEEP process is the connectivity to outside federal, state, and local responders to increase 
response efficiency for TVIs.  HSEEP provides specific guidance in exercise design, 
development, execution, and evaluation, as well as a corrective action program (U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, 2013c).   The development of a multiyear exercise program for TVIs sets 
an IHE up for success towards engaging stakeholders in a series of increasingly complex 
exercises (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c).  The use of more complex exercises, 
such as full scale exercises, allows for a test of the entire campus security plan.  The multiple 
events occurring simultaneously during a full scale exercise, which normally involve multiple 
external stakeholders, is the best method to fully analyze the actions of IHE personnel in 
accordance with the campus security plan (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c).  
Unfortunately, HSEEP full scale exercises are rarely planned and executed due to the cost and 
extensive logistical requirements.   
 The U.S. Department of Education, in collaboration with the Departments of Health and 
Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, published a 2013 “Guide for Developing High-Quality 
Emergency Operations Plans for Institutions of Higher Education” (U.S. Department of 
Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe  and Healthy Students, 
2013).  This preparedness guidance for IHEs is the most comprehensive to date with significant 
collaboration among federal agencies.  However, the 88 page guide is predominated by operation 
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plan recommendations, instead of specific requirements and accountability mechanisms for TVI 
planning.  This guide concedes that these are unfunded recommendations, not requirements.  
According to the U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, 
Office of Safe and Healthy Students (2013), 
The Departments issuing this guidance are providing examples of good practices and 
matters to consider for planning and implementation purposes.  The guidance does not 
create any requirements beyond those included in applicable law and regulations, or 
create any additional rights for any person, entity, or organization.  The information 
presented in this document generally constitutes informal guidance and provides 
examples that may be helpful. (p. 4) 
The guidance is not linked to specific federal requirements.  However, an IHE that decides to 
implement the federal agency recommendation incurs additional burdens on existing or new 
staff.     
 The Homeland Security Academic Advisory Council (HSAAC) was created to provide 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security with advice and recommendations on topics related 
to higher education (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015).  Some of these topics 
include graduate recruitment, academic research, faculty exchange, international students, cyber 
security, and campus resilience (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015).  HSAAC 
explains, “A resilient campus fully addresses the needs of its members during natural or man-
made disasters and crises by following the phases of national preparedness: protection, 
prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013a, 
p. 3).   
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 In order to improve campus resilience, HSAAC recommended the creation of a DHS 
Campus Resilience Pilot Program.   
The goals of the program are to promote FEMA’s Whole Community philosophy, draw 
upon existing DHS resources and also those originating from the U.S. Department of 
Education (ED) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to help colleges and universities 
plan for major man-made or natural incidents. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2013a, p. 3)   
IHEs were asked to submit proposals to participate, and a total of seven sites were selected:  
Drexel University (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), Eastern Connecticut State University 
(Willimantic, Connecticut), Green River Community College (Auburn, Washington), Navajo 
Technical College (Crownpoint, New Mexico), Texas A&M University (College Station, Texas), 
Tougaloo College (Jackson, Mississippi), and the University of San Francisco (San Francisco, 
California).  According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2013b): 
DHS will work with the seven selected colleges and universities to draw on existing 
resources, collaborate with federal, state and local stakeholders and identify new 
innovative approaches to promote campus resilience—directly supporting the goals of the 
President’s Plan to Reduce Gun Violence, and making educational institutions safer and 
more prepared.  “This is an important step in our work with the academic community to 
help campuses prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from and mitigate crisis 
and emergency situations,” said Secretary Napolitano.  Through their work with DHS, 
these colleges and universities will help us further develop best practices, resources and 
tools needed to assist campus communities nationwide in their efforts to reduce gun 
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violence on campuses and bolster resilience and emergency planning processes for all 
types of hazards. (p. 1) 
 Major findings of the CRS program were reported in the April 22, 2015 briefing 
materials: “Based on lessons learned and best practices identified . . . the Department found that 
college and university presidents and chancellors are the single most important factor in campus 
resilience and emergency planning” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 5).  The 
report noted that DHS needs to engage with higher education institution presidents and 
chancellors and requested input from the HSACC (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2015).   
 Some of the key outcomes from campus institution leaders noted in the CRS report was 
that college and university presidents are tasked with creating a “culture of preparedness” (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 10).  Future engagements with HSAAC will be very 
important to watch with regard to the focus of security preparedness with various levels of 
support.  Additionally, a web-enabled system is being developed as part of an outcome of the 
CRS pilot called the Campus Resilience Enhancement System which will be further developed in 
2015 and beyond (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015).   
 Without significant requirements from the government for campus security planning and 
preparedness, institution leadership vested theory is critical towards supporting action guide 
implementation.  According to Snyder and Holder (2015), “Administrators and public safety 
officials in higher education are empowered to set policy, direct resources, and facilitate 
conditions that develop resilient learning communities” (p. 60).  The quality of the programs 
supported are directly related to the vested interest of executive administrators, faculty, staff, and 
students.   
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 Given my background in port security for the U.S. Coast Guard, I am familiar with post 
9/11 changes in federal guidance regarding the maritime industry.  These changes may serve as a 
model for the IHEs in the future.  The 9/11 attacks spurred the creation of an entirely new federal 
department (Department of Homeland Security), the reorganization of several agencies within 
DHS (e.g., the U.S. Coast Guard), and the creation of a new agency (the Transportation Security 
Administration).  Furthermore, the events of 9/11 prompted legislative action in a variety of 
modes of transportation, not just air travel, significantly increasing security requirements, and 
federal funding.  For instance, the U.S. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) 
was created by Congress to enhance security regulations in conjunction with and/or under the 
auspices of the newly formed U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Carey, 2004).  The MTSA 
encompasses specific requirements for security plans and exercises with regard to the maritime 
industry and requires all federal, regional, and local agencies to work together with a multitude 
of state and private port partners (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).  A key element of the MTSA was the 
creation of Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC) which coordinate federal, state, local, 
and industry partnerships (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).  Per 33 CFR 103, AMSCs must report to the 
U.S. Coast Guard on their activities, which may include the following: port security planners at 
the local, regional and national level; port security exercise federal funding; and utilization of the 
Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) data to prioritize funding projects under the 
Port Security Grant Program (PSGP; U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).  It has been over 10 years since 
the new security requirements for the MTSA were created.  The MTSA and its AMSCs represent 
a success story regarding maritime security preparedness.  According to the U.S. Coast Guard 
(2013), AMSCs’ Challenges, Accomplishments, and Best Practices Annual Report (which is 
publically available) states: 
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Area Maritime [Security] Committees are the foundation of our nation’s maritime 
security efforts.  The cooperative effort between the private-sector, and the federal, tribal, 
state and local agencies is a widely recognized model of successful public-private 
partnership, and has built a strong, mature, and comprehensive security regime.  Port 
areas on the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific Coasts, the Western Rivers, and the Great Lakes 
are more secure resilient, and prosperous because of the cooperation, communication, and 
the work of Area Maritime Security Committees. (p. 1) 
 Despite the numerous lives lost and damaged from TVIs on U.S. campuses, there are still 
no specific federal regulatory requirements for security preparedness and exercises at IHEs.  
Publications from numerous federal agencies provide guidance, yet no legislation exists to 
mandate and track security preparedness activities related to TVIs.  These recommendations are 
strictly voluntary and are not bound to any type of federal requirement or institutional 
accreditation.  Perhaps the regulations developed for the maritime industry may serve as a model 
for IHEs to increase security preparedness and create a funding mechanism to support oversight 
and IHE security improvements.   
State Guidance for IHE Security Preparedness 
 The requirements that states have imposed upon IHEs vary from state to state.  The 
Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education created a requirement in 2006 that all schools, 
public and private, have some type of armed security (King, 2014).  Other recent examples of 
increased state requirements for armed officers include Iowa and Massachusetts (King, 2014).   
Without specific state or local legislative requirements, the decision whether to arm campus 
security personnel is different depending on whether the IHE is public or private (King, 2014).   
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 Another important difference in IHE security planning response resources is the decision-
making authority over arming campus and university security forces.  Public institutions’ 
decision-making authority rests with the State Board of Education or the president of the 
university (King, 2014).  At private institutions, the president of the IHE or the Board of Trustees 
is the decision-making authority.  Additionally, research in the state of North Carolina found that 
sworn police officers have better training and equipment than security guards (North Carolina 
Department of Justice, 2008). 
 Three months after the incident at Virginia Tech, a report was sent to the President of the 
United States, from the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Michael Leavitt; Secretary of 
the U.S. Department of Education, Margaret Spellings; and Attorney General, U.S. Department 
of Justice, Alberto Gonzales (Leavitt, Spellings, & Gonzales, 2007).  One of the major 
recommendations was that “Where we know what to do, we have to be better at doing it” 
(Leavitt et al., 2007, p. 16).  It was noted that while some states had taken advantage of grant 
funding from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Justice after 
the attacks of September 11, 2001 to improve IHE security preparedness, other IHEs had not 
transitioned planning efforts from terrorist incidents and natural disasters to active shooter and 
other significant contingency incidents on campus (Leavitt et al., 2007).   
 The report made major recommendations for state and local officials regarding active 
shooter preparedness.  According to Leavitt et al. (2007), the following actions should be taken: 
“Integrate comprehensive all-hazards emergency management for schools into overall local and 
state emergency planning.  Institute regular practice of emergency management response plans 
and revise them as issues arise and circumstances change” (p. 17).  As much as planning was 
stressed in the report, and some investment has been made in communication improvements at 
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IHEs, consistent maintenance funding for these systems has been problematic (Leavitt et al., 
2007).  According to Leavitt et al. (2007), two major federal recommendations were made: 
The U.S. Department of Education should review its information regarding emergency 
management planning to ensure it addresses the needs of institutions of higher education 
and then disseminate widely.  The U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, 
jointly and separated, and in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Education, should 
consider allowing existing grant programs to be used to facilitate joint training exercises 
for state, local, and campus law enforcement. (p. 18) 
 Also prompted by the shooting at Virginia Tech, the State of North Carolina formed a 
Task Force at the direction of its Attorney General.  According to North Carolina Department of 
Justice (2008), Attorney General Roy Cooper stated,  
Our goal is to learn from this horrible event and to use those lessons learned to better 
protect our North Carolina campuses. We owe it to the parents, students, faculty, and 
staff at our colleges and universities to be ready if a similar tragedy ever happened here. 
(p. iii)   
 One of the findings of the North Carolina Task Force was the need for more TVI training 
of faculty, staff, and students at IHEs.  The Task Force investigation revealed a clear lack of 
understanding of security protocols at Virginia Tech based on two significant events that 
worsened the situation.  First, the shooter left a note warning of a bomb. The note was found by a 
faculty member who took it to the Dean, instead of calling campus police according to university 
protocols.  Clearly the faculty member was not aware of the response plan, which delayed the 
campus security response.  Additionally, the perpetrator had chained several of the doors to the 
buildings closed to prevent evacuation.  Before the rampage began, a student found one of these 
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doors chained.  Instead of calling campus security to alert them that something was amiss (i.e., 
“see something, say something”), she crawled through a window out of the building (North 
Carolina Department of Justice, 2008).    
 These two instances at Virginia Tech led the North Carolina Task Force to recommend 
more faculty, staff, and student training in IHE emergency response plans (North Carolina 
Department of Justice, 2008).  The North Carolina Task Force conducted quantitative research 
analysis in a survey in 2007 with 110 public universities, community colleges, and private 
institutions with a 95% response rate (North Carolina Department of Justice, 2008).  Research by 
the Task Force found inconsistencies in the expectations of state emergency management 
officials for IHEs and what was actually happening.  According to the research, roughly half of 
the IHEs studied participated in county or regional preparedness training and 14% of IHEs did 
not hold any type of training or exercises (North Carolina Department of Justice, 2008).  
However, according to a Director of County Emergency Management, “Campuses must exercise 
the plan, fix the gaps in the plan, and review the plan again.  Testing of the emergency response 
plan ensures that everyone speaks the same language and knows their respective role” (North 
Carolina Department of Justice, 2008, p.12).  The North Carolina Task Force urged IHEs to 
make it standard practice to update emergency plans.  It points to FEMA’s guidance on the 
challenges of doing long term disaster preparedness (North Carolina Department of Justice, 
2008).   
 In July 2016, the Governor of the State of Michigan signed into law an active shooter 
alert bill (Gray, 2016).  According to this bill, law enforcement can send texts to citizens in the 
vicinity of an active shooter warning them of the danger.  The technology is similar to the Amber 
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alerts system used to notify people of missing children.  The bill was prompted after an active 
shooter killed six people in Kalamazoo, MI in February, 2016 (Brenzing & Cunningham, 2016).   
 As outlined above, TVIs are an unfortunate reality on campuses, specifically at IHEs. 
That raises the question, what can be done to stop this or at the very least mitigate the damage?  
This question elicits a variety of responses including, but not limited to, developing better 
methods to identify a potential attacker prior to the act, increased mental health screening, 
enacting tougher gun control laws, restricting access to campuses, allowing concealed weapons 
on campus, and improving security planning and preparedness.  While these all are important 
avenues to pursue with regard to campus safety, I will focus solely on methods to improve 
security planning and preparedness for the purposes of this study.  If we cannot prevent the 
violence from occurring, we can and must at the very least prepare IHE communities to respond 
more effectively.  The following sections will cover the established methods, as well as several 
innovative ones, to enhance overall campus security.  
IHE Security Planning and Preparedness  
 Security planning and preparedness for an active shooter incident (or incident of targeted 
violence) is a fundamental element of mitigating the risks to students, staff, and faculty and to 
ensure an optimal response to an incident.  According to Snyder and Holder (2015), “Building 
resilience among at-risk student populations, the faculty that educates them, and the staffs that 
support them is a moral imperative in a world in which evildoers will continue to prey on those 
who appear unprepared to react.” (p. 57).   
 The core document to prepare and respond to a TVI is a security plan.  Even though 
awareness has grown since the Virginia Tech, Illinois, and Oregon mass shootings, the lack of 
overall crisis management plans is a major problem that impacts institutional operations, 
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technology, and infrastructure (Wang & Hutchins, 2010).  According to Snyder and Holder 
(2015), “The importance of coordinated public safety responses to incidents of targeted violence 
that may involve the use of firearms, edged weapons, improvised explosive devices, barricading 
tactics, ambush tactics, and fire as a weapon, requires new levels of cooperation” (p. 58).  This 
cooperation is the centerpiece of security preparedness across higher education with regard to 
their partnerships internally and externally.  Faculty members, staff, and students should be 
considered important stakeholders in IHE security preparedness efforts. 
 Preparedness activities for active shooter scenarios involve a wide range of actions.  
Some of the key activities that ensure implementation of the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) for emergency response include developing security procedures from federal, 
state, and local emergency management partners; establishing mutual aid agreements for 
resources; identifying prearranged contacts to support active shooter responses; identifying 
strategies for lock down procedures; establishing emergency notifications; synchronizing IHE 
and local law enforcement to ensure resources are not duplicated; establishing marketing plans 
for staff, faculty, and students for active shooter plan review and training; and the assignment of 
campus personnel to the Incident Command System (ICS) functions (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2010).  Note that these are only recommendations from the U.S. Department of 
Education and are not required or tracked by any federal government agency.   
 According to a report from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (2003) on 
building a disaster-resistant university, “Campuses vary in their definition of acceptable losses 
and interruption because these decisions depend on the community, the nature of the hazard, and 
the available resources” (p. 5).  Security preparedness is very dependent on the vested interest of 
individual institution leaders.  The acceptance of the need for security preparedness must start 
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with the top officials of higher education institutions.  According to Burch and Bratton (2009), 
“University administration has key role during emergencies, therefore it is vital to get their input 
during the development of the plan. The administration has a different focus than law 
enforcement and will assist in developing a more comprehensive plan” (p. 29).  Vested interest 
in preparing for critical incidents involving violence on campus has many benefits.  Effective 
updates of security plans and a robust exercise program can lessen the negative impacts of a 
crisis event (Jenkins & Goodman, 2015).   
 Wang and Hutchins (2010) surveyed 350 major college and university provosts who felt 
prepared for normal day to day incidents on campus, but not crisis events. The study revealed 
gaps in the exercise of higher education security plans and implementation of after action reports 
from those exercises that have occurred on campus.  Many colleges and universities do not view 
the security plan as a dynamic document that should be routinely updated (Cheung et al., 2014).  
Security plans must be updated as information and variables change.  For example, key IHE 
stakeholders may change jobs, new strategies to security responses emerge, and lessons learned 
from internal exercises and from other institutions may yield new information (U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, 2013c).   
 Seo et al. (2012) found that even though most colleges have emergency plans in place, 
only 25% of campuses believed their students understood or were prepared to respond to a crisis.  
Even though many colleges and universities have a segment of the institution focused on 
emergency preparedness, many recommendations and guidance provided by federal government 
agencies to increase preparedness have not been adopted (Thompson & Schlehofer, 2014).  Only 
62% of police administrators indicated they had any type of plan to react to a security event 
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(Davis & Walker, 2005).  Additionally, the respondents indicated that most of those plans were 
multipurpose and lacked significant depth for security incidents.   
 Following the 2007 mass shootings at Virginia Tech, the Commonwealth of Virginia and 
federal governments called for investigative reports.  The “Report of the Review Panel” 
presented to the Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia included information from a myriad 
of experts with significant work experience in the Federal Bureau of Investigations, State 
Council of Higher Education for Virginia, and most notably The Honorable Tom Ridge, the 
former Governor of Pennsylvania and first Secretary of Homeland Security (Virginia Tech 
Review Panel, 2007).  According to the findings of the “Report the of the Review Panel” the 
emergency response plan was deficient in several areas including no specific plans for an active 
shooter response, it did not provide police much of a voice in terms of decision making and the 
planning process, and the names of many authorities in the plan were out of date and incorrect 
(Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007).  According to the Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007), 
“Shootings at universities are rare events, an average of about 16 a year across 4,000 institutions.  
Bombings are rarer but still possible . . . A risk analysis needs to be performed and decisions 
made as to what risks to protect against” (p. 18).  A review of Virginia Tech’s response planning 
before the incident shows that an informal risks analysis was performed by campus 
administration in which it determined not to invest in active shooter training, response planning, 
and exercises (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007).   
 The Virginia Tech shooting was followed by extensive litigation from family members 
over negligence by the institution.  For example, the families of Erin Peterson and Julia Pryde 
sued Virginia Tech for negligence by not issuing timely warnings of the initial shooting incident.  
The families were awarded four million dollars (Lenn, 2014).  Additionally, Virginia Tech was 
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fined $55,000 by the U.S. Department of Education, which later was reversed on appeal (Lenn, 
2014).     
 While Virginia Tech was an example of poor preparation and lack of vested interest, the 
University of Massachusetts Dartmouth represents an example of proper planning, preparedness, 
and vested interest.  In 2013, the Boston Marathon Bombing resulted in the deaths of three 
individuals and injuries to at least 264.  One of the bombers was enrolled at the nearby 
University of Massachusetts Dartmouth.  During the bombings and the days following, while this 
attacker was on the loose, the University had to prepare for multiple scenarios of targeted 
violence including an active shooter situation, bombing, or hybrid target violence incident 
(Jenkins & Goodman, 2015).  Prior exercises had revealed gaps in the institution’s crisis plans 
which allowed for plan improvements prior to the incident in 2013 (University of Massachusetts 
Dartmouth, 2013).  According to Jenkins and Goodman (2015), “The UMass Dartmouth 
experience strongly suggests that testing and refining a crisis plan is an effective strategy to 
avoid a descent into ad hoc decision making during an emergent crisis situation” (p. 204).  Not 
only did the emergency responders have a thorough understanding of the crisis plan, but senior 
campus officials who had read and exercised the plan also understood the plan which lead to 
expedient and informed decisions in response to the incident.  Actions by federal and state 
agencies during this event averted a potential TVI at an IHE.   
 Incorporating local emergency management is a critical component of the security 
preparedness plan (Burch & Bratton, 2009).  It was also noted that access to the emergency 
response plan was critical for successful implementation.  The U.S. Department of Justice 
guidelines recommended that campus law enforcement officials should not just inform students 
and faculty about emergency response plans, but also include residents living around IHEs and 
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community groups (Burch & Bratton, 2009).  However, less than 60% of schools provided a 
copy of the campus emergency plan to local law enforcement agencies who might have to 
support IHEs in a TVI (Cheung et al., 2014).  The lack of higher education security planning 
engagement with local responders is not just a problem in the U.S., it is an international problem.  
Studies abroad also show gaps in emergency and disaster preparedness.  One study of 21 Italian 
universities found that very little interaction occurred between higher education personnel and 
local civil protection, fire, police, or emergency (Cheung et al., 2014). 
 On July 22, 2016, Public Law No: 114-199 went into effect that allows public safety 
agencies to use federal grant money to pay for active shooter response programs (U.S. 
Government Publishing Office, 2016).  Known as the POLICE (Protecting Our Lives by 
Initiating COPS Expansion) Act of 2016, the measure does not authorize new spending, but 
instead expands funding for the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) to pay for active 
shooter training not just for law enforcement officers, but also EMS and fire crews (Wilson, 
2016).  Having first responders trained in uniform and consistent tactics for active shooter 
events, such as the training provided by ALERRT (Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response 
Training), can improve success when responding to such a crisis.   
IHE Security Exercises  
 Response to a critical incident involving a TVI (or all-hazards incident) is a collaborative 
effort among many entities on campus, including campus law enforcement, emergency 
management department, student affairs, departmental leaders, faculty, administrative staff, 
students, and many other support groups on campus.  Engaging in preparedness exercises is an 
excellent and critical method to raise the knowledge level of faculty, staff, and students to 
respond to a security incident (Eaker & Viars, 2014).  Exercising campus security plans can find 
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weaknesses that need correction, but more importantly relationships can be established.  The 
relationships between key stakeholders (e.g., chancellor, provost, head of emergency 
management services, campus police chief, and numerous local first responders) is critical to 
making good decisions in a short timeframe required in a low-frequency high-risk critical 
incident  (Jenkins & Goodman, 2015). 
 Exercises can range from workshops, drills, table top exercises, functional exercises, and 
finally full scale exercises.  Workshops bring a group of individuals together to build 
components of a security plan.  Drills help identify issues that need to be addressed in the plan, 
as well as plans for communication and response.  A drill involves one or only a few community 
partners (e.g., law enforcement, fire) and relevant campus staff who use the actual campus 
grounds and buildings to practice how to respond to a scenario (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2013c).  According to research by Han, Ada, Sharman, and Rao (2015),  
Students in focus groups told us that because drills are held to educate students regarding 
the actions they need to take in case of building-related incidents, they are likely to 
immediately comply with notifications related to these events – they did not perceive any 
need to verify the messages content in such an event. (p. 925)  
This research supports that exercises and drills can help students in preparing for TVIs and 
complying with directives from campus or law enforcement authorities during these incidents.  
 In a table top exercise, participants, usually emergency responders, discuss an imagined 
scenario and how the campus or a department will prepare for, respond to, or recover from an 
emergency (U.S. Department of Education, 2007; 2010).  Tabletop exercises are recommended 
for all critical campus staff that have a function in carrying out the security plan.  Training before 
and after exercises can also be beneficial for all stakeholders.  A functional exercise is similar to 
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a drill, but includes more community stakeholders and campus participants.  Participants react to 
realistic simulated events (e.g., a bomb in a residence hall and an intruder with a gun in a 
classroom) and implement the plan and procedures using the ICS protocol (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2013c).  Finally, a full scale exercise is the most resource intensive activity 
in the exercise continuum.  A full scale exercise is generally a multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional 
effort in which all resources are deployed as they would be for an actual critical incident (U.S. 
Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe  and 
Healthy Students, 2013).    
 Following an exercise, an after action report is completed.  This report details lessons 
learned from an exercise and recommended corrective actions to be placed in the contingency 
plan.  After action reporting and corrective action guidance is provided by FEMA’s Homeland 
Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP).   Four specific overall performance 
requirements are part of the HSEEP process.  According to the U.S. Department of Education 
(2010), the HSEEP requirements are: 
Conducting an annual training and exercise plan workshop and developing and 
maintaining a Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan.  Planning and conducting exercises 
in accordance with the guidelines set for in HSEEP, vols. I-III.  Planning and conducting 
exercises in according with the guidelines set forth in HSEEP, vols. I-III.  Developing 
and submitting a properly formatted After-Action Report/Improvement Plan (ARR/IP).  
The format for the AAR/IP is found in HSEEP, vol. III.  Tracking and implement 
corrective actions identified on the AAR/IP. (p. 56)   
This is a systematic approach that federal and state governments are required to follow for 
exercise programs for all contingencies.   
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 Federal, state, and local exercises follow NIMS, which is utilized at many colleges and 
university campuses (Fazzini, 2009).  NIMS is the national framework set up to respond to real 
world incidents and routine incident management in the United States.  HSEEP guidelines for 
exercises validate the use of NIMS for planning activities.  The greatest incentive for complying 
with HSEEP is that the federal government will do a partial cost recovery after a major incident 
(Fazzini, 2009).  Five steps towards gaining HSEEP exercise compliance include:  (a) having a 
governing board or institution leadership council initiate the NIMS structure, (b) personnel must 
be trained appropriately, (c) all hazard emergency plans must be established, (d) those plans must 
be tested, and (e) a continual review process must be established (Fazzini, 2009).   
 Testing security plans through exercises should be completed with functional to full scale 
exercises that can range from a few hours to multiple days.  Preparation is critical to effectively 
responding to security incidents.  According to Frazzano and Snyder (2014),  
It is commonly accepted that under stress, most responders will revert to what they have 
been trained to do.  While it is easy to criticize the choices made during an event, making 
instantaneous decisions is a difficult task in which instincts, prior training, and 
knowledge come into play. (pp. 4-5) 
Many IHEs do not conduct full scale exercises where the entire campus is impacted in an 
evacuation or lockdown.  Some institutions cite the disruption for conducting exercises on 
students as the reason for not doing more to thoroughly test emergency plans (Boynton, 2003).  
The International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) 
conducted a survey to evaluate college and university preparedness to respond to a terrorist 
incident (Davis & Walker, 2005).  The study showed that only 53.2% of the respondents had 
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participated in a mock security exercise.  The literature demonstrates a lack of overall focus on 
security exercises by IHEs.   
 In a collaboration between the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance 
and the Major Cities Chiefs Association, Burch and Bratton (2009) published “Campus Security 
Guidelines.”  These guidelines called for increased frequency of emergency response exercises.  
According to the 2009 report, “It is imperative the emergency response plan is drilled at least 
once a semester with all relevant parities participating.  Campus public safety should seek 
assistance of local law enforcement and other outside agencies to plan and conduct these 
exercises” (p. 31).  These guidelines also noted that some university administrators lack the 
understanding of the ICS protocol.  A 2007 study pointed out that a majority of senior IHE 
officials rarely participated in an exercise for a terrorist incident or mass shooting (Wang & 
Hutchins, 2010).  Local law enforcement was strongly urged to reach out to campus 
administrators, encouraging them to sign up and complete ICS courses and participate in campus 
exercises (Burch & Bratton, 2009).   
 Language in the U.S. Department of Education’s (2010) “Action Guide for Emergency 
Management at Institutions of Higher Education” puts the importance of exercises at institutional 
discretion based on resource availability.  Furthermore, it stresses how resource-intensive full-
scale exercises can be versus tabletop exercises.   
Before making a decision about which type of exercise to facilitate, a higher education 
institution should consider varying factors, including the amount of time and resources 
and collaborative support required to execute the activity balanced against the outcome of 
the experience.  For example, while a tabletop exercise may be cheaper and less time-
consuming to run, a full scale exercise provides a more realistic context for the simulated 
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response to an emergency situation, thus providing more constructive feedback to 
implement into plans. (U.S. Department of Education, 2010, p. 52)  
The benefits are described, but could be enhanced if risk reduction factors were included in 
preventing and responding to TVIs to help justify institution commitment to a robust security 
exercise program.   
 Additional research has shown that many active shooter exercises and drills at IHEs 
primarily involve campus police and other local law enforcement agencies (Snyder & Holder, 
2015).  Students, faculty, and staff are rarely involved in various types of exercises or active 
training, yet these are the individuals typically in the front lines of active shooter incidents and 
have a high percentage of thwarting attackers (Snyder & Holder, 2015).  In Blair and Schweit’s 
(2014) analysis of active shooters between 2000 and 2013, they found that 69% (44 of 64) of 
incidents, for which the time is known, were concluded in less than five minutes and 23 of those 
were completed in less than 2 minutes.  In a crisis situation, faculty, students, and staff cannot 
simply wait around for law enforcement to arrive.    
 Marketing is one of the main recommendations to increase interest and enthusiasm across 
the spectrum of IHEs to adopt the HSEEP process.  Guidance from the U.S. Department of 
Education (2010) recommends, “As with all planning and implementation initiatives, there is a 
danger that enthusiasm will wane as time passes.  An annual review and update process is a way 
to combat this problem and renew enthusiasm for a vigorous emergency management program” 
(p. 56).  The U.S. Department of Education acknowledges a gap in support planning and 
exercises.  No law, regulation, or accreditation board currently exists to hold IHEs accountable 
for active shooter planning and exercises (U.S. Department of Education, 2010).  As a result, 
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exercise programs are haphazard and rely on marketing of infrastructure improvements or other 
media driven outreach from the institution that stresses security preparedness and exercises.  
 The guidance in the literature for public primary and secondary schools takes a different 
approach regarding crisis planning.  According to the U.S. Department of Education (2007): 
Despite everyone’s best efforts at crisis prevention, it is a certainty that crisis will occur 
in schools.  Good planning will facilitate a rapid, coordinated, effective response when a 
crisis occurs. Being well prepared involves an investment of time and resources-but the 
potential to reduce injury and save lives is well worth the effort.  Every school needs a 
crisis plan that is tailored to its unique characteristics. Within a school district, however, 
it is necessary for all plans to have certain commonalities. (p. 3-1)  
The language used here is much stronger regarding the need for consistency and competency in 
planning and training.  In contrast, the recommendations for IHEs issued by the U.S. Department 
of Education (2010) are much more open ended. 
 Another important aspect of campus preparedness is the level of commitment to training.  
Campus personnel must train with the same commitment as if they were in an actual emergency.   
Blair et al. (2013) describe the “One Warrior’s Creed” written by a military and law enforcement 
officer, Steven Randy Watt: “If you seek to do battle with me this day you will receive the best 
that I am capable of giving . . . I have trained, drilled, and rehearsed my actions so that I might 
have the best chance of defeating you” (p. 77).  Exercises should be performed as if your life 
and/or the lives of those around you depended on it and not just a box to check off to 
demonstrate a task was completed.  Exercise planners must maintain proficiency and maintain 
the strongest commitment to exercise objectives followed by drafting excellent lessons learned 
reports.   
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IHE Security Accreditation 
 IHE safety and security accreditation may be obtained through two nonprofit law 
enforcement organizations to help provide independent standards and verification of campus 
security preparedness.  The first of these is the Commission on Accreditation for Law 
Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) and the second is the International Association of Campus Law 
Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA).  The CALEA standards are specific to law enforcement 
agencies in general.  While CALEA also has developed IHE specific accreditation certification 
guidelines, IACLEA is solely focused on campus law enforcement administrators and campus 
security plans and exercises.  IACLEA accreditation provides a higher standard above the HEOA 
of 2008 requirements.   
 The U.S. Department of Justice (2005) addressed the lack of accreditation in campus 
safety and security, “While campus police departments may pursue CALEA accreditation, 
certain characteristics and functions unique to campus operations are not addressed in the 
broader police standards” (p. 45).  As a result, the U.S. Department of Justice (2005) 
recommended nationally recognized standards for campus safety and security during the 
National Summit on Campus Public Safety in December of 2004.  The summit was coordinated 
by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS).  
COPS selected delegates based on their extensive expertise in campus safety and security and 
other delegates were selected from key areas across the campus including student services, 
administrators, and student organizations.  The summit produced an extensive list of strategies 
for colleges and universities in a homeland security environment.  One of the key 
recommendations produced by this summit is that,  “National standards, similar to those of the 
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA), should be 
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developed and implemented to guide campus police and security operations and enhance the 
profession” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2005, p. 55).  The COPS office awarded a grant to the 
IACLEA to help develop standards applicable to IHEs nationwide (U.S. Department of Justice, 
2005).  
 IACLEA developed 210 standards in collaboration with numerous state law enforcement 
accreditation agencies, including The Georgia Law Enforcement Accreditation and the Texas 
Police Chiefs Association Foundation (International Association of Campus Law Enforcement 
Administrators, 2015).  The benefits of accreditation as described by the International 
Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (2015), are as follows:  
Accreditation does not purport that one agency provides better services to its campus than 
a non-accredited agency.  What it does signify is that the accredited agency was carefully 
measured against an established set of standards and has met or exceeded accepted 
practices in campus public safety. (p. iii)    
IACLEA Accreditation Commission oversees accreditation standards.  It is comprised of 12 
voluntary members from a diverse representative of campus communities across the nation, and 
from public and private IHEs, as well as sworn and non-sworn agencies (International 
Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, 2015).  Additionally, membership 
within the Accreditation Commission includes representatives from other higher education 
associations, including American Council of Education, the National Association of Student 
Personnel Administrators, and the National Association of College and University Business 
Officers (International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, 2015).  These 
additional members ensure a broad spectrum of campus safety professionals with input and 
connectivity to the accreditation process.  
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 Upon receipt of accreditation, IHEs must adhere to annual reporting requirements and 
reapply for accreditation every four years (International Association of Campus Law 
Enforcement Administrators, 2015).  IACLEA accreditation standards cover a broad spectrum of 
campus safety issues, ranging from traffic and parking to critical incident management.  Critical 
incident management is the focus of analysis in this review as it relates to TVIs.  IACLEA’s 
accreditation requirements regarding critical incident management are consistent with the 
requirements of the HEOA of 2008 (J. Leonard, personal communication, January, 16, 2016).  
Furthermore, these requirements include more specific planning beyond the basic requirements 
of the HEOA of 2008 regarding testing emergency response and evacuation procedures.  
According to IACLEA’s accreditation standards, “The plan should also identify responsibilities 
of all command and general staff positions in a critical incident as they relate to the command, 
operations, planning and logistics and finance/administration sections” (International Association 
of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, 2015, p. 72).  These requirements follow the 
NIMS and the ICS protocol consistent with national federal agency guidance.  Section 17.1.3 of 
the accreditation standards requires an annual review of all hazards that should be integrated with 
specific institutional response plans for various TVIs (International Association of Campus Law 
Enforcement Administrators, 2015).    
 As of January 2015, only 43 institutions of the 1,200 IACLEA members had obtained 
IACLEA accreditation per an IACLEA representative (J. Leonard, personal communication, 
January, 16, 2016).  Why have so few members of IACLEA, let alone non-members, sought 
accreditation?  The accreditation process is less than 10 years old, it is time consuming for 
campus law enforcement and emergency management representatives, and it comes at a cost (J. 
Leonard, personal communication, January, 16, 2016).  The cost of accreditation depends on the 
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size of the IHE.  For those IHEs with less than 10,000 students, the cost of accreditation is 
$3,000 the first year and $2,500 every year thereafter (International Association of Campus Law 
Enforcement Administrators, 2015).  IHEs with 10,000 or more students, the cost is $3,000 per 
year for the accreditation and the annual review process (International Association of Campus 
Law Enforcement Administrators, 2015).   
 In the interest of proactively and effectively protecting the entire campus community, as 
well as protecting the institution itself from liability issues, IHEs should be invested in obtaining 
accreditation to improve campus response and planning to TVIs.  Jenkins and Goodman (2015) 
comment on the role of IHEs and campus safety, illustrating the importance of vested interest in 
security preparedness:    
Parents and guardians send their children to college with the understanding that these 
institutions are committed to the safety and welfare of their children, and indeed, case law 
has recognized this responsibility . . . The loss of credibility that stems from an 
ineffective crisis response may lead to devastating consequences to the institution. (pp. 
208-209)  
Challenges and Supplements to Security Preparedness 
 While campus preparedness resource investments have increased somewhat over the last 
20 years, the focus has been on improving mass communications with limited support given to 
other preparedness activities (Schafer et al., 2010).  Email and text messaging have become a 
cornerstone of communications at IHEs.  Most campus security preparedness after the Virginia 
Tech incident focused on implementing communications.  For example, Holyoke Community 
College (HCC) increased security spending from $400,000 in 2001 to $700,000 in 2010 
(Violino, 2010).  HCC instituted new programs on campus including an emergency phone 
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internet protocol system for messaging throughout the college.  Ivy Tech Community College 
made numerous security improvements including installing a closed circuit TV system, 
notification technology, emergency call stations, and enhanced police presence 24/7 on campus 
(Violino, 2010).  Research has shown that at Southern Ontario University, 95.6% of students 
indicated they would be in favor of instituting a mass notification system.  Data regarding 
technology use during the study showed that 61.4% of students and 82.8% of faculty members 
check email routinely during the day and over 80% have their university emails forwarded to 
them if personal email is primarily used (Butler & Lafreniere, 2010).  Additionally, it was 
reported that over 80% of students owned a cell phone.  
 Research in Florida and North Carolina showed similarly positive responses to the use of 
warning messages through text messages and emails (Sattler et al., 2011).  Students also made a 
cultural shift by participating in voluntary security notification programs after the Virginia Tech 
incident.  For example, Princeton University instituted an emergency notification program in 
2006, utilizing texts and phone calls during emergencies, but the student participation rate was 
very low (Selingo, 2008).  However, after the Virginia Tech shootings in 2007, over 90% of the 
incoming freshmen signed up for Princeton’s emergency notification program (Selingo, 2008).  
Despite the positive reception of the use of mass communication for emergencies on campus, 
limited research has been done on the effectiveness of these systems to date (Sattler et al., 2011).   
 Significant gaps still exist in resource support to train faculty and staff in campus security 
preparedness (Eaker & Viars, 2014).  The investments in campus security that have been made 
since the Virginia Tech incident have not been integrated in security planning and exercises at 
many institutions.  According to Snyder and Holder (2015), “Investments in TVI related training, 
technology, and policies consume considerable resources and have increased for many 
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universities following the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre” (p. 57).  Simply purchasing technology 
without adequate planning can be problematic (McIntire & Wexler, 2015).  For instance, do the 
nearby cell towers have the capacity to handle thousands of mass notifications via text messaging 
in the event of an incident?  Campus security investments are mostly subject to cost-benefit 
analysis (Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008).  According to a survey in 2008 after the Virginia Tech 
incident, less than 10% of respondents noted that their institution had received some level of 
outside funding to help cover the cost of safety and security related efforts, initiatives, and 
purchases.  Security investment benefits can be difficult to analyze for an institution that has 
never had a TVI.   
 Despite the enormous safety and liability issues, numerous state legislatures have debated 
the potential of allowing guns on campus (Lipka, 2008a).  As of January 2015, the following 
states are reviewing proposed legislation to overturn policies banning students, faculty, and staff 
from carrying licensed, concealed handguns on campus: Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington (Bouffard, Nobles, Wells, & 
Cavanaugh, 2012).  The State of Ohio passed a law allowing guns on the state’s higher education 
campuses, but required guns to be stored in storage facilities and or locked in parked cars on 
campus (Lipka, 2008b).  Many IHEs have used the Supreme Court rulings to justify the ban on 
concealed weapons.  The Supreme Court has upheld that a school is not a student’s home as he 
or she does not rent space there, and therefore, cannot carry a concealed weapon (Cramer, 2014).   
 Virginia Tech had prohibited anyone from carrying firearms on campus, regardless of 
special permits to carry a concealed weapon (Cramer, 2014).  Following the Virginia Tech 
incident the campus organization, Students for Concealed Carry (SCC) was formed.  The 
primary mission of the SCC was to change attitudes regarding carrying a concealed weapon on 
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campus (Cramer, 2014).  The members of the SCC believed that the absence of firearms on 
campus, in the hands of licensed and permitted individuals, increased the vulnerability and risk 
from the growing number of active shooter incidents on IHEs (Cramer, 2014).  As in Virginia, 
many IHEs in Oregon were supportive of gun bans and gun free zones on campus, including 
Umpqua Community College.  Only one unarmed security guard was present at Umpqua 
Community College during the shootings in 2015 (McIntire & Wexler, 2015).  
Summary 
 A gap in the literature exists regarding the readiness of IHEs’ implementation and 
maintenance of strong security preparedness for future TVIs.  The available scholarly research 
and federal agency security preparedness guidance to colleges and universities has been 
presented in the literature review.  Numerous studies before the large scale shooting incidents at 
Virginia Tech and North Illinois University demonstrated the infrequency of campus security 
exercises.  There has been no appreciable increase in security exercise frequency even afterwards 
based on a review of the literature.  While a large percentage of IHEs have a security plan, the 
implementation of the plan is not regulated or supported with direct federal funding and is 
therefore haphazard and independent of each IHEs’ priorities and missions.  As resources 
continue to dwindle at many IHEs, best practices that minimize cost and maximize preparedness 
in TVI planning, exercise development and execution, and incorporation of exercise lessons 
learned must be a top priority.  My goal throughout this research study was to identify barriers to 
and best practices of campus security planning and exercises that will allow IHEs to better 
prepare and respond to TVIs.   
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS 
Overview 
The purpose of this qualitative collective case study was to determine themes, including 
barriers to and best practices for planning and exercises regarding TVI security preparedness at 
IHEs.  Assembling detailed and thorough information through established case study data 
collection strategies ensured the maximum results through the data analysis process.  The 
sections that follow describe the design of the study, as well as research questions, participants, 
procedures, data collection, and data analysis.   
Design 
Five commonly used qualitative research designs include narrative study, 
phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study (Creswell, 2013).  A narrative 
approach is more appropriate for an analysis of an individual’s life story, dealing in oral and/or 
written forms of communication.  Phenomenology pertains to the “essence” of an experience by 
examining people who have shared the experience through interviews.  Grounded theory 
generates an explanation for an action as described by a large number of individuals who have 
experienced the action.  Ethnography is an approach centered on understanding the culture of a 
group.  A case study approach allows for an in-depth analysis of a particular topic using 
interviews, observations, and documentation.as forms of data collection (Creswell, 2013).  I have 
chosen the case study approach for this research study as it allows for an in depth focus on one or 
more cases of a topic, in this case, security preparedness for TVIs at IHEs.  A case study design 
allowed me to utilize a variety of data sources, rather than being limited to the perspectives of 
selected interviewees.  
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Qualitative case study research can be completed using three different methods, which 
include single case study, collective case study, and intrinsic case study.  Single case study 
research looks only at one issue and selects the best bounded case available (Creswell, 2013).  A 
collective case study also only looks at one issue, but choses two bounded cases to research the 
issue (Creswell, 2013).  Lastly, with an intrinsic case study there is an evaluation of a bounded 
case itself without choosing a specific issue (Creswell, 2013).  In order to optimize the results of 
this study, I chose a collective case study, as opposed to a single case study.  With just one 
bounded case (i.e., institution) in the study, there is a greater potential to miss out on best 
practices or to discover barriers to security preparedness (Yin, 2014).   
I researched potential IHEs to participate in this study based on their demonstrated vested 
interest in TVI preparedness to determine nationwide best practices.  The collective approach 
was completed at two institutions that granted me access to their site documentation, allowed me 
to observe their exercises, and agreed to conduct interviews with key institutional stakeholders.  
Creswell (2013) provides three key benchmark questions for the case study approach:  “Does the 
report have a conceptual structure (i.e., themes or issues)? Were sufficient raw data presented? 
Do observations and interpretations appear to have been triangulated” (p. 264)?  I employed 
these collective case study benchmarks to ensure thorough data collection at each institution.  
Furthermore, I utilized several of the six data collection procedures recommended by Yin (2014).   
Research Questions 
The following are the research questions I developed to help form interview questions: 
(a) How do institutions integrate federal agency multiyear exercise guidance of various types of 
exercises (workshop/seminar, tabletop, functional, and full scale) for the campus security plan?  
(b) How are exercises of the campus security plan measured for overall preparedness to respond 
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to large-scale acts of violence with multiple student injuries and loss of life?  (c) How are 
previous TVI exercise lessons used in follow-on exercises or updates to a campus security plan?  
(d) How can the attitudes and behaviors of faculty, staff, and administrators consistently remain 
focused on investing in active shooter overall campus preparedness?  (e) Would new legislation 
that regulated IHE security plans and exercises increase the level of overall IHE security 
preparedness?  By synthesizing participants’ answers to these questions, I developed 
recommendations to increase campus preparedness. 
Setting 
For the purposes of this study, I chose to include only four year private and public IHEs 
to maintain consistency among settings.  The setting of this collective case study was at two 
IHEs located along the East Coast of the United States.  To maintain anonymity, I use the 
pseudonym designation of Alpha for the first IHE and Bravo for the second.     
Alpha Institution is located in a city with a population of 104,870.  Undergraduate and 
graduate enrollments, as of the Fall 2014 semester, were 12,993 and 1,618, respectively.  The 
average age of undergraduate students was 22 years, with only 14% aged 25 and older.  The 
student body is comprised of 62.4% females and 37.6% males.  According to the demographics 
from the Fall 2014 semester, ethnicity of enrolled students was broken down as follows:  
American Indian/Alaskan Native <1%, Asian 2%, African American/Black 5%, Hispanic 7%, 
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander <1%, White 79%, two or more races 3%, international 
1%, race/ethnicity not reported 3%.  Students from out of state comprised 17.9% of the student 
body, while in-state students comprised 82.1%.  The institution has a staff of 1,250, with 612 
full-time faculty and 273 part-time faculty.  It offers a total of 49 majors at the bachelor level and 
42 majors at the master level. 
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Bravo Institution is located in a large metropolitan city with a population of 1.55 million.  
The institution enrolls a total of 26,359 students, of which 16,896 are undergraduates, 9,463 are 
graduate students, and 5,284 are online students.  The average age of students is 23 years.  
Females comprise 46.7% of the student body, while males comprise 53.3%.  As of the Fall 2014 
semester, reported ethnicity of students from the U.S. is as follows:  American Indian/ Alaskan 
Native 0.2%, Asian 15.1%, African-American/Black 7.5%, Hispanic/Latino 6.8%, multi-race 
(not Hispanic/Latino) 3.3%, Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islander 0.7%, White 63.8%, unknown 
2.6%.  The student body also contains 12.8% international students from 121 countries.  Bravo 
Institution offers 200 degree programs within its 15 colleges.   
Participants 
 Purposeful sampling was the method I used to locate two institutions with a high level of 
engagement in security preparedness as determined via available documentation researched 
online.  Using purposeful sampling is the most efficient sampling, where the best institutions 
could be selected that will inform the study (Creswell, 2013).  I established contact with both the 
Alpha and Bravo Schools regarding their desire to participate in this study and received an 
overwhelming level of enthusiasm from each.  Campus personnel that I intended to interview 
included faculty, the Dean or Assistant Dean of Student Affairs, other representative of Student 
Affairs, senior representative of the Safety and Security Department, and a senior representative 
of the police or security personnel.   
Procedures 
 The procedures for the study followed a systematic process.  First, I completed the 
research prospectus at the beginning of EDUC 989 in the spring semester of 2016.  The 
prospectus included application documentation for IRB approval.  Once IRB approval was 
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granted for the research plan, and both the dissertation chair and other committee members have 
given approval, I began the collection of data recruitment and informed consent, according to the 
dissertation timeline (see Appendix A).  Initially, I conducted research via publicly accessible 
websites to gain information on the participating IHEs’ background information on emergency 
response information, and detailed information regarding the best stakeholders to interview.  
After the two institutions provided written consent to participate in the research study, I began 
data collection in the spring of 2016.  Data collection strategies I used include site documentation 
review, participant observations, and interviews.  This data collection strategy maximized the 
collection of potential security preparedness best practices.  Identified best practices for 
increasing vested theory in campus security preparedness was discussed with key institution 
stakeholders during the interview phase of data collection.  Participating individuals from each 
IHE were given pseudonyms.  After completion of the data collection process, I began analysis 
as described in the research plan.   
The Researcher's Role 
 As a member of the U.S. Coast Guard for the past 18 years, I have developed an expertise 
in contingency planning, exercise planning, and execution for all types of hazards. Members of 
the U.S. Coast Guard are required to meet exacting standards and rigor in contingency planning.  
However, I am well aware that the rest of society does not always follow these strict guidelines.  
My professional background in mandated port security planning and exercises should not be a 
bias because the overall federal guidelines recommended for IHEs are very similar.  My faith 
guides me as an individual, husband, father to my two children, professional, and doctoral 
student conducting this qualitative study.  
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Data Collection 
I used the triangulation method in the analysis of site documentation (i.e., security plans, 
preparedness training activities, and review of after action reports), observations, and interviews 
of different groups of campus stakeholders.  The convergence of multiple data sources (i.e., 
triangulation of several sources of data) is in accordance with Yin’s (2014) description of case 
study design.  I chose the following sequence of data collection to maximize baseline 
information on each institution’s security planning and exercise process, which in turn allowed 
for the most effective information exchange during interviews with IHE participants: 
Step 1: I contacted prospective participant universities via email and provided them with 
a copy of the Liberty University IRB template with specific request for institution participation 
(see Appendix E).  Agreements to participate from the institutions are required via signed letter 
on institutional letterhead or via email response to me.  
Step 2: I requested the security plans (focused on active shooter response) of each 
institution for review at either the IHE or remotely.  Upon access to the information, I conducted 
a thorough review of the IHE security plan. 
Step 3: Documentation of previous TVI exercises (with emphasis on active shooter 
response), including lessons learned, was requested for my review either at the IHE or remotely.   
Step 4: I conducted observations of security exercises and planning meetings completed 
in the timeframe of research data collection.  
Step 5:  I conducted field interviews using interview questions geared toward specific 
types of participants (refer to Appendix B).    
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Site Documentation Review 
Site documentation is a qualitative data collection strategy of reviewing reports, 
administrative documents, evaluations, and numerous other external and internal IHE 
information (Yin, 2014).  Site documentation is important in this study to corroborate 
information from many different sources regarding IHE security preparedness activities and 
determined overall best practices (Yin, 2014).  I began with a thorough review of site 
documentation, including security plans, in accordance with federally recommended guidelines 
from FEMA, DOE, and other federal agencies.  I surveyed the data for themes and issues across 
both cases to determine the similarities, differences, and major gaps in each plan (Creswell, 
2013).  The federal Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Plan (HSEEP) was developed to 
implement standardization in developing and executing exercises in a broad range of 
contingencies, from hurricane response to campus TVI events (Altizer, 2008).  Exercise after 
action reports were analyzed by me to determine if they follow the HSEEP protocols.  I reviewed 
each participating IHEs’ publicly available documentation pertaining to active shooter plan 
development, exercise frequency, and outreach to the public.   
Site documentation data collected helped determine how vested each of the two 
institutions are in the HSEEP program.  For instance, do they have periodic TVI active shooter 
exercises?  If institutions have TVI active shooter exercises, then lessons learned can be 
reviewed, and best practices collected.  The collection of exercise data is critical to analyzing 
which best practices increase IHE vested theory in security preparedness.  
Participant Observations 
Participant observations are another collective case study method to collect evidence on a 
real-world topic (Yin, 2014).  Observations are very important in qualitative research as a key 
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data collection technique (Creswell, 2013).  Activities utilized in data collection can include 
observations about a specific setting, individual participants, activities, interactions, and 
conversations (Creswell, 2013).  Participant observations could be formal or informal based on 
the availability of IHE security preparedness activities over the data collection period.  Security 
preparedness activities that I targeted for observation include security plan review, active shooter 
exercise development, exercise planning meetings, student active shooter training, or other 
associated activities.  I wanted to observe these preparedness activities to determine the 
institution’s campus security plan knowledge, actions to be taken during an active shooter 
incident, understanding of Incident Command System (ICS), and other preparedness activities as 
recommended by the U.S. Department of Education, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
and other federal agencies.  I took notes during the security preparedness activities.  I recorded 
relevant information on the Observation Protocol Form (see Appendix D; Creswell, 2013).  The 
main point of contact at each participating IHE introduced me to the participants during the 
preparedness activity (Creswell, 2013).  
Interviews 
Interviews are one of the most important elements of qualitative case study research and 
include structured questions according to approved protocols that are proposed in an unbiased 
manner (Yin, 2014).  I used the purposeful sampling technique to find key participants to 
interview, including campus security staff and administrators in a guided conversation or open-
ended question format (Yin, 2014).  Noor (2008) comments on the semi-structured interview: 
“As the interview was the primary data gathering instrument for the research a semi-structured 
interview was chosen where questions were carefully designed to provide adequate coverage for 
the purpose of the research” (p. 1603).  The use of semi-structured and open-ended questions 
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helped me solicit a narrative response and develop a story about security preparedness at each 
institution (Creswell, 2013).   
To begin, I obtained interview consent from each interviewee.  The interview protocol 
followed a specific format (see Appendix C), as I developed different interview questions for the 
various stakeholders (see Appendix B) as recommended in Creswell (2013).  I followed Yin’s 
(2014) protocol for short case study interviews and did not exceed an hour in duration.  I 
conducted interviews with the participants in person.  The primary interview technique was in 
person on the respective campuses at a site of the subject’s choosing.  I documented the 
interviews with the use of a digital audio recorder device.  Additionally, I kept hand-written 
researcher notes of each interview.  Finally, I personally transcribed the interviews into Word 
documents and saved these to my secured password protected home computer (Creswell, 2013).  
Research questions (a-e) were addressed by the interview questions (refer to Appendix B) via 
this data collection strategy.  
Data Analysis 
 Data analysis was completed using a variety of established case study method strategies 
in a sequenced order of completion as listed below.   
 Step 1: A primary data analysis tool in qualitative research is memoing, which I used in 
this study for plan and exercise review, site observations, and interviews.  Memoing includes 
writing notes (key phrases and ideas) in the margins of interview transcripts (Creswell, 2013).  
After reading each interview transcript, I completed the memoing process for all participants at 
the two institutions.  Initial categories were created, not exceeding 10 (Creswell, 2013).  
 Step 2: Coding of data includes reviewing the transcript text for specific key codes that 
can be developed from memoing (Creswell, 2013).  Using Ethnograph, a qualitative data analysis 
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software, I coded the data to search for key words, count the number of times these words were 
used, and conducted Boolean searches to match information (Yin, 2014).   
 Step 3: Using theoretical prepositions that are a cornerstone of qualitative data inquiry 
(Yin, 2014), I executed the data analysis strategy.  The theoretical preposition used in this case 
study was vested theory.  The objective of my study design was to determine how IHEs could 
become more vested with security preparedness activities.   
 Step 4: The analytical technique for qualitative case studies that I chose, the cross case 
synthesis, is one of five techniques described by Yin (2014).  A primary method of analysis 
between two cases is the use of word tables to display information and compare cases (Yin, 
2014).  Similarities and contrasts can be determined by using word tables (Yin, 2014).  My plan 
was to develop recommendations for IHEs that maximize security preparedness and are 
attractive for adoption by IHEs.  These recommendations must incorporate methods to change 
attitudes and behaviors at IHEs to make security preparedness for an active shooter event firmly 
rooted into the campus culture.  
 Step 5: Quality control of data analysis was completed by several different methods.  
First, all observations, site documentation, and transcripts were fully reviewed (Yin, 2014).  I 
completely reviewed all critical evidence twice during the analysis process (Yin, 2014).  Next, it 
is important in case study research to look at the rival interpretation (Yin, 2014).  As a result, I 
considered the philosophy of not conducting security preparedness activities due to high resource 
investment as a rival position.  Third, the most important part of case study research analysis is 
to stay focused on key ideas and not get distracted by less important information (Yin, 2014).  I 
remained focused on the most significant aspects of the case by ensuring the research questions 
were completely addressed in the data analysis process.  Lastly, according to Yin (2014), “You 
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should use your own prior, expert knowledge in your case study” (p.168).  I utilized my expertise 
in contingency planning and exercises in collecting and analyzing the case study.  
Trustworthiness 
 The accuracy of the findings of this qualitative study were improved by using several 
strategies that build trustworthiness (Creswell, 2013).  These strategies include credibility, 
dependability, transferability, and confirmability (Creswell, 2013).  Trustworthiness of research 
is critical for new and experienced researchers.  Additionally, having a member of the 
dissertation committee who is an expert in hybrid target violence helped the overall 
trustworthiness of the research study.  
Credibility 
 Credibility inspires belief in a research study.  Building credibility in a study is an 
important tool to ensure overall trustworthiness in a study.  Prolonged engagement with subjects 
and persistent observations are methods to build credibility (Creswell, 2013).  This was 
accomplished by prolonged engagement with the two institutions involved in the case study and 
providing researcher availability to short-fused scheduled activities in campus security 
preparedness.   
 I used member checks with the participants to ensure I obtained accurate information 
(Creswell, 2013).  The process of member checks was followed as described in Yin (2014).  
Triangulation of different data sources of data collection was used to determine the most 
appropriate behaviors to increase focus on active shooter planning and exercises (Creswell, 
2013).  I gave a clear picture of past experiences in safety and security planning to all 
participants.   
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Dependability 
 Dependability is the capability of being depended on.  Dependability was enhanced by 
my detailed note taking during the entire research study and tape recording interviews and 
observations whenever possible (Creswell, 2013).  From this information, I derived key 
quotations from participants (Creswell, 2013).  Additionally, subjects were given the opportunity 
to review all notes or transcripts developed from interviews.  Peer debriefing sessions are an 
excellent method to ensure that security preparedness methods and motivations are clearly 
understood (Creswell, 2013).   
Transferability 
 Transferability is the ability to take a research method in one study and apply it to another 
study.  Transferability was enhanced by my use of the thick description process during the data 
analysis phase, which describes the campus participant’s position at the institution (Creswell, 
2013).  Not only does the study include commonplace descriptions, but it also includes 
descriptions of places, events, and people as described by the subjects, who, according to Stake 
(1995), “are the most knowledgeable about the case” (p. 102).  Thick descriptions used in the 
study incorporate standard planning and exercise language from the DOE and FEMA in order to 
allow security preparedness information to be easily transferred to a larger IHE population 
(Creswell, 2013). 
Confirmability 
 I asked an outside consultant, one that was not involved in the study, with a background 
in hybrid target violence to review the research proposal and results to determine if conclusions 
are supported by the data collected (Creswell, 2013).  The expert review of findings, 
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interpretations, and conclusions of the study greatly increased the confirmability of this study 
(Creswell, 2013). 
Ethical Consideration 
 Ethical considerations include my receipt of authorization to access institutional 
participants.  Prior to conducting the study, I obtained the institution’s approval in writing.  I 
thoroughly explained the process of the research study and indicated that participation is 
voluntary.  Privacy concerns of study participants is a priority.  As a result, all research 
participants were given pseudonyms and I reviewed the data to ensure easily recognized 
identifiers that could be applied to research participants or the institutions were removed.  Lastly, 
following the exact procedures detailed in the Liberty University IRB guidelines was crucial in 
maintaining the integrity of the study.  Upon meeting a potential participant, I provided them 
with an Informed Consent form.  Furthermore, I notified each individual that participation in this 
research study was strictly voluntary and participants had the right to withdraw at any time.  
Research data were backed up to portable thumb drives which were stored in a lock box in my 
home (Creswell, 2013).  Lastly, the digital audio recorder with interviews and information were 
also kept in a lock box in my home.     
Summary 
 In conclusion, the methodology of this study is a qualitative collective case study design.  
Triangulation of data was completed using site documentation, observations, and field 
interviews.  Participant selection, collection of data, and the analysis of data was completed in 
accordance with Liberty University IRB guidelines.  Trustworthiness was a top priority of my 
research study and I made every attempt to avoid any potential ethical issues.    
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS 
Overview 
 The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of this study.  Data were collected 
from two institutions and include information gathered from campus security plans (including a 
review of after action reports) and observations of preparedness training activities.  Memoing 
was completed on each campus security plan, exercise after action report, and observation notes.  
Additional data were gathered from field interviews of different campus stakeholders.  
Purposeful sampling techniques were used to target key participants to interview, including 
administrators, faculty, emergency managers, and campus security staff.  The interviews were 
held in a guided conversation or open-ended question format (Yin, 2014).  Data from the 
interviews were organized into two categories of interviewees: administrators/faculty and 
emergency managers/police for each institution case study.  
 The purpose of this qualitative collective case study was to discover barriers to campus 
security preparedness for TVIs and determine the most successful tactics to incorporate 
preparedness throughout all IHEs.  The most relevant themes developed from analysis of the data 
include hindrances, recommendations, best practices, and vested interest.  For the purposes of 
this study, I define these themes as follows:  hindrances are barriers to security preparedness 
activities; a recommendation is a suggestion by an interviewee to improve conditions at the IHE; 
best practices are exceptional actions taken at the IHE previously and currently; vested interest 
are actions that may increase IHE participation in security preparedness.   
Participants  
 Purposeful sampling was the method I used to locate two institutions with a high level of 
engagement in security preparedness as determined via available documentation researched 
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online.  For the purpose of anonymity, these institutions are referred to throughout this study as 
Alpha Institution and Bravo Institution.  It is very important to emphasize both institutions were 
selected based on excellent campus security preparedness programs as determined upon my 
review of the literature.  One of the institutions has a campus security certification from the 
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA).  The CALEA campus 
security certification is described as, 
A proven modern management model; once implemented, it presents the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), on a continuing basis, with a blueprint that promotes the efficient use of 
resources and improves service delivery - regardless of the size, geographic location, or 
functional responsibilities of the agency. (Commission on Accreditation for Law 
Enforcement Agencies, 2016)   
The other institution has a Disaster Resistant University (DRU) designation assigned by FEMA.  
The Disaster Resistant University program is a guide developed from the work of six universities 
and colleges that have addressed their preparedness for any incident to become more “disaster-
resistant” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003).   
 Purposeful sampling was also the method used to acquire subjects for the interview 
portion of this study.  This sampling yielded six interviews at Alpha Institution and four at Bravo 
Institution, for a total of 10 interviews.  I included participants from the faculty, administrators 
(e.g., Dean or Assistant Dean of Student Affairs, other representative of Student Affairs), senior 
representatives of the Emergency Management Departments, and a senior representative of the 
campus police.  An interview of each representative from each category was completed, with the 
exception of a faculty member at Bravo Institution.  Several faculty members were contacted and 
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either never responded to emails or were not available.  The interviewees are listed in Table 2 
with alphanumeric indicators in place of names.   
 
Table 2  
List of interview participants with respective roles and institutions  
Interviewee 
Pseudonym 
Interviewee’s Role Institution 
Date 
Interviewed 
A7 Emergency Manager/Police  Bravo 3/15/2016 
A8 Emergency Manager/Police Alpha 5/16/2016 
A9 Administrator/Faculty Alpha 5/16/2016 
A10 Administrator/Faculty Alpha 5/16/2016 
A11 Emergency Manager/Police Alpha 5/16/2016 
A13 Emergency Manager/Police Alpha 5/17/2016 
A14 Administrator/Faculty Alpha 5/17/2016 
A15 Emergency Manager/Police Bravo 6/14/2016 
A16 Emergency Manager/Police Bravo 6/27/2016 
A17 Administrator/Faculty Bravo 6/28/2016 
 
Results 
The following is a brief summary of each type of data: site documentation review, 
observations, and interviews.  Site documentation review was completed at both institutions with 
a focus on collecting data to address the research questions.  The documentation review was used 
to corroborate information from many different sources regarding IHE security preparedness 
activities and determine overall best practices (Yin, 2014).  Types of documentation reviewed at 
both institutions include Campus Security Plan Review, preparedness training activities, and a 
review of exercise after action reports.  
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 Observation of campus exercises was conducted at Bravo Institution only.  I had hoped to 
schedule an observation at Alpha Institution, however, none were scheduled during the data 
collection phase of this study.  A three hour campus safety exercise was observed at Bravo 
Institution in April 2016. 
 A total of 10 interviews were conducted using the interview protocol listed in Appendix 
C.  Interviewees were given one of two sets of similar questions (see Appendix B), but which 
were worded differently depending on their role within the institution.  For instance, 
administrators and faculty were given a list of questions slightly different from those given to 
emergency managers and police.  Note that in the original design of the Interview Questions in 
Appendix B, “Dean or Assistant Dean of Student Affairs” was the category for one set of 
questions and “Campus Emergency Managers and Senior Police Representative” for the other 
set.  During the data collection phase, I included faculty and other administrative staff in the 
interview process, so the “Dean or Assistant Dean of Student Affairs” group was renamed 
“Administrators and Faculty.”  All interviews were conducted in person with the use of a 
digital audio recorder device and in accordance with the Liberty University IRB requirements.  
The data are outlined and triangulated below, organized by research question (a-e).  Table 3 
illustrates the relationship between the five research questions detailed in Chapter One and the 
corresponding interview questions (see Appendix B) designed to answer each.  
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Table 3 
Research Questions with corresponding Interview Questions 
 
All interviews were transcribed and sent to the interviewee for review and comment.  
None of the interviewees replied with comments.  Transcriptions of the field interviews were 
uploaded into the qualitative software data analysis package, Ethnograph, 6.0, by Qualis 
Research, for analysis.  Code words and/or phrases were identified and aggregated, from which I 
identified four consistent themes within the data: hindrances, recommendations, best practices, 
Research Question 
Administrator/Faculty 
Interview Question 
Number 
Emergency 
Manager/Police 
Interview Question 
Number 
(a) How do institutions integrate federal agency 
multiyear exercise guidance of various types of 
exercises (workshop/seminar, tabletop, 
functional, and full scale) for the campus 
security plan?   
 
1 1, 2, 3, 6 
(b) How are exercises of the campus security 
plan measured for overall preparedness to 
respond to a large-scale active shooter 
incident with multiple student injuries and loss 
of life? 
   
2, 3 4, 6 
(c) How are previous TVI exercise lessons used 
in follow-on exercises or updates to a campus 
security plan?   
 
4, 5, 6 5 (n.b., moved from 
(a) to (c)), 6 
(d) How can the attitudes and behaviors of 
faculty, staff, and administrators consistently be 
focused on investing in active shooter overall 
campus preparedness?  
 
7 7, 8 
(e) Would new legislation that regulated IHE 
security plans and exercises increase the level 
of overall IHE security preparedness?   
 
8 9 
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and vested interest.  Table 4 lists the counts of these themes separated by the role of the 
interviewee. 
 
Table 4 
Counts of themes found in interviews 
 
Themes 
Role of Interviewee Hindrance Recommendation Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
Administrators/ 
Faculty 
14 23 20 9 
Emergency 
Managers/ Police 
39 17 48 8 
 
 
Each research question (a-e) is listed below, followed by the relevant data from the site 
documentation review, observations, and interviews.  Data from the interviews are presented in 
Tables 5–23 and are organized by the interview questions linked to each research question.  
These tables list the key phrases or codes derived from an analysis of the interview data along 
with the corresponding theme and institutional affiliation.  A summary of each Research 
Question follows at the end of each data set. 
Research Question (a) Results 
Research Question (a).  How do institutions integrate federal agency multiyear exercise 
guidance of various types of exercises (workshop/seminar, tabletop, functional, and full scale) 
for the campus security plan?   
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Site documentation review.  Alpha Institution’s emergency operations plan is a blend of 
federal agency planning guidance and connected to local and state partners in emergency support 
functions.  The base Emergency Operation Plan (EOP) complies with the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS), as required by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA).  Bravo Institution’s security plan links individual building playbooks, which are 
maintained electronically on the institution’s website.  The building playbooks are developed for 
all hazard contingencies, reviewed, and approved by the institution’s authorities.  An exercise is 
then scheduled which may lead to the creation or major update of a building playbook.   
Alpha Institution has a variety of preparedness training activities conducted through both 
the campus police department and the health and safety department.  Many of these training 
activities are incorporated into exercises using the HSEEP process for campus security plan 
exercises.  Bravo Institution also has a variety of preparedness training activities available from 
campus police or campus emergency management personnel.      
 Alpha Institution held several active shooter exercises in 2013 and 2014.  The after action 
reports reflected overall consistent guidance from HSEEP on exercise documentation.  As of 
May 2016, Bravo Institution had conducted one active shooter exercise in the last three years.  
The after action report reflected overall consistent guidance from HSEEP on exercise 
documentation and different types of exercises.    
Observations.  A three hour campus safety exercise was observed at Bravo Institution.  
The campus emergency exercise for a large scale medical scenario appeared to be utilizing 
federal exercise guidance. 
Interviews.  Tables 5-8 outline the interview questions designed to answer Research 
Question (a).  Following each table is a brief description of the pertinent data themes. 
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Table 5  
Responses to Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #1: Does your institution have a regular 
program for conducting campus preparedness exercises in accordance with the federal agency 
guidance (links to research question [a])? 
  
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept Hindrance Recommendation 
Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
University 101 on campus preparedness  Alpha   
Student noncompliance with campus 
procedures from emergency phone 
messages 
Alpha    
Reinforce faculty obligations in 
classroom active shooter incident 
 Alpha   
Chancellor’s Council on Safety and 
Security 
  Alpha  
Need interest of the department chair in 
active shooter training 
   Alpha 
Faculty focused on research only Alpha    
Advanced active shooter training every 
couple of years for senior 
administrators  
  Alpha  
Multi-faceted approach, orientation, 
individual training 
 Alpha   
I know they happen Bravo    
 
  
The data from Alpha Institution showed a strong level of knowledge regarding exercise 
guidance from the campus security plan.  Due to the low number of available administrator or 
faculty interviewees at Bravo Institution, no cross case synthesis was available.  Several 
statements strongly stated the lack of focus on campus security, along with increasing overall 
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IHE requirements, was a major hindrance.  Interviewee A9 commented: “The difficulty becomes 
that we’re asked to participate in so many trainings, meetings, and committees.  Some of these 
things just get lost in the mass, regardless of their importance” (A9 Interview, May 16, 2016).   
Recommendations included federal support for improved security preparedness, as well 
as a having a multifaceted approach to campus preparedness training that includes student and 
faculty orientation on campus preparedness. A best practice noted was the use of a Chancellor’s 
Council on Safety and Security which reviews campus TVI after action reports, determines 
priorities based on risk, and makes recommendations for potential funding to senior 
administrators.  Department Chairs are a critical link to creating vested interest of faculty in 
campus security preparedness. 
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Table 6 
 
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #1: How does your institution 
conduct faculty and administrative staff training on the security plan (links to research question 
[a])? 
 
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept Hindrance Recommendation 
Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
Faculty and staff orientation   Alpha  
Human Resources Act required basic 
emergency training employees 
  Alpha  
Faculty not subject requirements Human 
Resources Act 
Alpha    
Key decision makers Chancellor, Vice 
Chancellor, one on one training 
  Alpha  
Administrative building playbooks 
initiated 
  Bravo  
Active shooter website use tracker  Bravo   
Significant staff obligations with 
growing requirements 
Bravo    
Infrequent involvement in student 
orientation 
Bravo    
Development of online training new 
employees 
 Bravo   
 
A significant hindrance to security preparedness at IHEs was the growing staff 
obligations.  One recommendation was made to require IHE active shooter training for students 
as a prerequisite to register for courses.  Best practices centered on including campus security 
preparedness training at faculty and student orientations, and extending the requirements for the 
Human Resources Act to faculty.  No vested interest items were recommended.  Data from both 
100 
 
Alpha and Bravo cross case synthesis showed a lack of requirements on faculty and students for 
security preparedness training was a significant hindrance.   
 
Table 7 
 
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #2:  How does your institution 
involve multiple partners (local emergency management, local responders) in the security 
planning process (links to research question [a])? 
 
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept Hindrance Recommendation 
Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
Local partners exercise evaluators and 
controllers  
  Alpha  
Local partner memorandum of 
understanding joint training  
  Alpha  
Local partner Jurisdictional Agreements   Alpha  
Local Partner Mutual Aid Agreements   Alpha  
Strong liaison with local emergency 
management  
  Bravo  
Local partner exercise involvement   Bravo  
Local partner mutual aid agreements   Bravo  
Strong relationship local fire department   Bravo  
Joint training local responders   Bravo  
Senior EM leadership quarterly meeting 
with Homeland Security 
  Bravo  
Local partners sent exercise information   Bravo  
 
Hindrances, recommendations, and vested interest themes were not identified for this 
interview question.  However, numerous best practices were noted for integrating exercise plans 
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which centered on joint training and partnering with local, state, and federal counterparts that 
work with individual IHEs.  Interviewee A7 stated, “All of this includes partners, and our 
partners are University of [nearby Bravo School], Amtrak, [subway system in large city where 
Bravo School is located], OEM Office of Emergency Management, and Fire Administration” 
(A7 Interview, March 15, 2016).  A cross case synthesis revealed overall very strong 
relationships with local partners on many levels was a key best practice at both institutions.  
 
Table 8 
 
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #3:  Does your institution have a 
regular program for conducting campus preparedness exercises (links to research question [a])? 
 
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept Hindrance Recommendation 
Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
Three year exercise plan that follows 
HSEEP guidance 
  Alpha  
Exercise types and complexity limited 
by funds and staff availability 
Alpha    
Dedicated emergency response position   Bravo  
Establish short and long range goals for 
drills and exercises  
 Bravo   
Teaching active shooter fundamentals: 
run, hide, fight  
  Bravo  
Update of building playbook usually is 
followed by exercise 
  Bravo  
Train staff to update security plan  Bravo   
Train staff and faculty on plan updates 
before the exercise occurs  
  Bravo  
Multiple days and times for training 
anticipating pushback and conflicts 
  Bravo  
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Funding was the biggest hindrance cited in preventing the development of functional and 
full scale TVI exercises.  The most significant recommendation was to educate administrative 
representatives and other staff on updates to the campus security plan.  Interviewee A16 stated,  
One of the things that we’ve missed in the past, I think is, that I am now really pushing, 
prior to my turn here, they would develop these plans and just go to the drill.  I have a 
concern that you develop these plans that you’ve got to train that staff as to what did you 
change in the drill and you know between the original plan usually and an upgraded plan, 
in particular, a lot of the people are not the same people. (A16 Interview, June 27, 2016) 
Another excellent recommendation from Interviewee A16 was making security preparedness 
available to fit multiple IHE stakeholder schedules.   
I try to say to them “What is so important in your job, if you know two weeks from now 
that you have to be at training for an hour, can’t you figure out some way to get whatever 
the deadline is for that Monday done Friday or done by 9:00 Monday so you can be at 
training and we’ll only keep you for an hour.” We’re trying to really work with people 
and work with their schedules, but there’s always that resistance. (A16 Interview, June 
27, 2016) 
No significant cross synthesis was noted between the two institutions.  
Research Question (a) summary.  Triangulation of the three data types showed that 
both institutions integrate federal agency multiyear exercise guidance overall in developing 
different types of exercises for the campus security plan.  The HSEEP program, which is run by 
FEMA, was found in site documentation for both institutions, observations for institution Bravo, 
and during multiple interviews.  Significant cross case synthesis was shown during triangulation 
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of the data for the four themes of exercise hindrances, recommendation, best practices, and 
vested interests. 
 The primary hindrance to fully implementing exercise guidance from FEMA is the 
overall lack of funding to support the preparedness cycle of four exercise types.  Most exercises 
at both institutions were either workshop/seminars or table top exercises.  These exercises are the 
simplest exercise types and least expensive to design.  These exercises tend to require a limited 
amount of stakeholders, have simple objectives, and are not multifaceted with linking internal 
and external partners.  The limited amount of functional and full scale exercises for campus TVI 
does not allow for the full benefit of the exercise preparedness cycle to design, exercise, develop 
lessons learned, and update the security plan in a systematic process.  The lack of funding and 
limited staff dedicated to planning and exercises (e.g., a myriad of all hazards plans from point of 
distribution exercise for a pandemic, extreme weather events, sporting events, and TVI events) 
was the largest hindrance to completely meeting federal exercised guidance.   
 Second, numerous recommendations were triangulated between the three data collection 
methods for both institutions.  The recommendation for the establishment of a long term exercise 
plan was supported by senior higher education administrators, staff, and faculty.  It was 
recommended that senior administrators, faculty, staff, and students participate in exercises to 
the maximum extent possible.  This is even more important with the large turnover of students 
and faculty changes within many IHEs across the country.   
 A significant best practice triangulated from the data was the importance of integrating 
the campus security plan and exercises with other stakeholders that may impact the IHE.  State 
and local emergency management representatives, including police, fire, and medical response 
units, should be part of campus security exercise design teams, exercise participants, and 
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observers.  Vested interest in campus exercises must stem from a multifaceted approach through 
security plan training activities before, during, and after exercises.  IHE security planning 
partners who develop individual building playbooks must be engaged in the entire exercise 
campus security plan annually. 
Research Question (b) Results   
Research Question (b).  How are exercises of the campus security plan measured for 
overall preparedness to respond to a large-scale active shooter incident with multiple student 
injuries and loss of life?   
Site documentation review.  Exercises at Alpha Institution are in accordance with the 
exercise schedule prepared annually by the institution’s Emergency Manager.  Bravo Institution 
holds periodic TVI exercises and exercise corrective actions for administrative updates of the 
security plan are coordinated by campus emergency management representatives.  Preparedness 
training activities at the Alpha Institution are measured by attendance at TVI trainings, activity in 
various campus preparedness communication platforms, and availability of campus preparedness 
information to students on the institution’s website.  TVI training requests at Bravo Institution 
tend to be very high following a TVI at another IHE, otherwise, attendance at regularly 
scheduled trainings is low.  Preparedness training activities at the Bravo Institution were not 
specifically set with metrics to track effectiveness. 
According to the exercise after action reports, the active shooter exercises held by Alpha 
Institution in 2013 and 2014 were measured at several key areas within the institutional security 
plan, including the Emergency Operations Center, the Incident Command Post, and activities of 
the Crisis Decision Team (CDT).  The most recent active shooter exercise held at Bravo 
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Institution was measured at several key areas in the institutional security plan, including a large 
campus building.  Multiple campus partners were invited and participated in the exercise.   
Observations.  Bravo Institution measured its exercise I observed in 2016 based on the 
pre-training given to participants and their ability to follow the plan as directed by exercise 
handouts provided for all participants.  The objectives of the exercise were covered before it 
began.  The functional exercise included students, staff, and faculty.  The exercise was measured 
by how the exercise players carried out the required duties and responsibilities as laid out in the 
contingency plan.   
Interviews.  Tables 9-12 illustrate the responses to interview questions designed to 
answer Research Question (b).  A description of the significant themes follows, along with 
meaningful quotes from some of the interviewees. 
 
Table 9 
Responses to Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #2: What is your role on campus 
regarding an active shooter incident and the institution security plan (links to research question 
[b])? 
 
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept Hindrance Recommendation 
Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
Dependence on emergency management 
for instructions during TVI 
Alpha    
All Hazards Plan, and that Safety 
Council 
  Alpha  
Dependence on police for instructions 
during TVI  
Bravo    
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Measurement questions of campus security exercises showed a hindrance for lack of 
knowledge by some interviewees from administration and faculty at Alpha Institution.  
Interviewee A9 stated: “I have no idea. That’s never even been discussed with me. I make the 
assumption just like any disaster preparedness thing that I would receive an email that would 
provide instructions for what I need or a text message” (A9 Interview, May 16, 2016).  No 
recommendations were noted for this question.  However, an administrator/faculty member at 
Alpha Institution, Interviewee A14,  was very knowledgeable about their All Hazards Plan and 
Safety Council, both listed as best practices.  This individual commented, “That Committee has a 
range of different people on it and it’s the right people to have at the table” (A14 Interview, May 
17, 2016).  No vested interest items were coded.  Due to the low number of available 
administrator/faculty interviewees at Bravo Institution, no cross case synthesis was warranted. 
 
Table 10 
Responses to Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #3: Have you ever participated in an 
active shooter exercise or training (links to research question [b])? 
 
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept Hindrance Recommendation 
Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
Host National ALERRT training for 
active shooter 
  Alpha  
Have police department rep qualified as 
National ALERRT Trainer 
  Alpha  
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No themes for hindrance, recommendations, or vested interested came from this 
interview question.  A significant best practice identified among multiple interviews at Alpha 
Institution was having national Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training 
(ALERRT) for certain staff and even sending a relevant staff member to be trained to teach this 
system to others back at the institution. No cross case synthesis was possible given the lack of 
data from Bravo Institution for this interview question. 
 
Table 11 
 
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #4: How does your institution 
measure the effectiveness of security plan exercises (links to research question [b])? 
 
  
Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept Hindrance Recommendation 
Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
 
Subject matter experts as observers from 
local partner agencies   
 
   
Alpha 
 
Percentage of campus personnel signed 
up for alert warning system 
 
  Alpha  
Voluntary opt in alert warning system 
 
Alpha    
Enterprise Risk Management 
Committee evaluates exercise After 
Action Reports 
 
  Bravo  
Exercise Hot Wash 
 
  Bravo  
Exercise standard evaluation parameters 
 
  Alpha  
 
A major hindrance identified by this interview question was Alpha Institution’s voluntary 
policy for IHE staff, faculty, and students to opt in to the emergency notification system.  
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Despite this, a large number of campus personnel have opted in to the system.  No 
recommendations or vested interest codes were identified.  Using subject matter experts from 
local agencies as observers was identified as a best practice as it fosters those relationships and 
allows for plan knowledge growth.  Interviewee A11 stated:  “Your standard evaluation observer 
comments, and review and self-evaluations, and we use subject matter experts as our evaluators, 
offsite and onsite” (A11 Interview, May 16, 2016).  Cross case synthesis showed the importance 
of completion of exercise after action reports or having an exercise hot wash, which is a short 
review post exercise, at both institutions.  
 
Table 12 
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #6: How is ICS incorporated in the 
security planning process and what are any best practices (links to research question [b])? 
 
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept Hindrance Recommendation 
Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
Number of individuals who sign up for 
the alert notification system  
   Alpha  
Measurement is done by number of 
risks identified at the end of an exercise 
  Bravo  
Utilization of the Risk Management 
Committee 
  Bravo  
Review of risks and potential actions by 
Risk Management Committee 
  Bravo  
Hot wash   Bravo  
 
 Items generated during a hot wash meeting after the exercise is a primary method of 
measuring exercise effectiveness.  Additionally, the use of evaluators who are experts in the field 
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of campus security from other institutions or who are local stakeholders who know the campus 
security plan can help gauge the effectiveness of exercise participants.  
Research Question (b) summary.  The triangulation of data regarding how IHE 
campus security plans are measured to respond to a large-scale active shooter incident focused 
on feedback from exercise evaluators, observers, and hot wash items developed from participants 
after the exercise.  Participation from administrators, faculty, staff, and students is another 
method used to measure overall preparedness to respond to an active shooter incident.  
Participation includes attendance metrics at preparedness training sessions in person and online, 
willingness to volunteer to participate in exercises, feedback given after an exercise during a hot 
wash, and overall willingness to implement exercise after action recommended items.   
 The greatest hindrance triangulated from the data was the overall high levels of apathy 
from campus stakeholders.  For a short time, following a TVI event in another location, 
participation in various security preparedness activities increased; however, not long afterwards 
complacency and apathy set in.  It was recommended that measurement methods of campus 
security preparedness be routinely briefed to senior administrators.  Senior IHE administrators 
must ensure faculty and staff are aware of the negative consequences of being unprepared for a 
TVI regarding loss of life and significant recovery challenges (e.g., Department of Education 
enforcement penalties, lawsuits) for the IHE.  
A best practice to measure campus security plan preparedness is to create institutional 
groups with key stakeholders to champion preparedness planning, exercises, and training.  For 
instance, an All Hazards Plan and a Safety Council is utilized at Alpha Institution and an 
Enterprise Risk Management Committee is used at Bravo Institution.  Security plan preparedness 
can be enhanced by administrators, faculty, and staff who receive training in national security 
110 
 
preparedness.  A highly regarded national training program is the Advanced Law Enforcement 
Rapid Response Training (ALERRT).  Vested interest measurement indicators of campus 
preparedness should center on interest from senior campus administrators and senior faculty 
(e.g., deans, department chairs) by participating in exercises.  These stakeholders then actively 
engage to develop solutions to complicated exercise after action report items. 
Research Question (c) Results  
Research Question (c).  How are previous TVI exercise lessons used in follow-on 
exercises or updates to a campus security plan?   
Site documentation review.  Alpha Institution’s base Emergency Operation Plan (EOP) 
has numerous hazard specifics including hurricane, winter weather, tornadoes, severe 
thunderstorms, flood, active shooter, and several other contingencies.  Exercises are scheduled 
according to the multi-year training schedule and the institution had several active shooter 
exercises in the last three years.  Lessons learned from previous exercises at Alpha Institution in 
the last three years were documented in the after action report improvement plan matrix.  Certain 
action items had not been addressed to date and most of those included some type of funding to 
implement that specific action.  Campus emergency management representatives from Bravo 
Institution forward after action requirements for additional resource corrective measures to 
institutional leadership for review, prioritization, and potential funding. 
At Alpha Institution, lessons learned from previous preparedness training activities 
supporting the campus security plan are incorporated in future activities.  For example, campus 
police training for active shooter incidents within campus buildings can be very disruptive during 
the day.  As a result, campus police on the night shift conduct preparedness training activities, 
utilizing paint ball guns and various scenarios, throughout the campus buildings.  At Bravo 
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Institution, lessons learned from previous preparedness training activities supporting the campus 
security plan are incorporated into future activities. 
 During my interview with a campus police representative at Alpha Institution, we 
discussed the active shooter after action report.  The campus police department had made most of 
the recommended changes pertaining to campus police for active shooter policies and 
procedures.  Bravo Institution’s post active shooter exercise after action report activities included 
comprehensive evaluation of the institution’s security plan, utilization of the HSEEP Exercise 
Evaluation Guides (EEGs), and exercise hot wash with players, controllers, and evaluators.  
Observations.  A meeting was held at Bravo Institution after the exercise I observed to 
gather lessons learned.  The exercise design team and participants demonstrated excellent 
engagement in the hot wash to identify numerous problems and potential solutions to update the 
campus plan on that specific contingency.  Some of the lessons learned pointed out by 
participants showed a lack of knowledge of the contingency plan being exercised and individual 
specific job aid requirements.   The exercise director specifically showed interest in all of the 
feedback received and made participants feel part of the plan improvement process.  Additional 
after action report items sent by the observer were taken with great interest and appreciation.  
Interviews.  Tables 13-17 depict the significant themes derived from interview questions 
designed to answer Research Question (c).  
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Table 13 
 
Responses to Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #4:  What are best practices you have 
observed from campus active shooter training or exercises (links to research question [c])? 
 
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept Hindrance Recommendation Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
Passive mode Alpha    
Multifaceted    Alpha  
Prioritizing from the top down   Alpha  
Virtual messaging   Alpha  
Comprehensive security campaign: 
messaging and posters, could be 
everything from pedestrian safety, 
personal safety, active shooter 
 Alpha   
Looping videos through the campus 
network of monitors  
 Alpha   
Videos annual student leadership 
conference 
 Alpha   
Using ICS   Alpha  
Communication across disciplines     Alpha  
Multiple agency use of 800 Megahertz 
communication system 
  Alpha  
It’s important to be able to evaluate 
proper actions in an  active shooter 
incident 
  Bravo  
Key into first responder actions Bravo    
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One significant hindrance noted was that IHEs take a passive role in learning from 
exercise lessons learned.  Interviewee A14 noted: 
In 2004 when there were two murders here, we stood up the Care Office and we did all 
these things because it was necessary.  You can easily fall into a reactive versus a 
proactive mode when it comes to all of this stuff.  Which is a long way to say, right now 
it’s not that we’ve forgotten about active shooter.  We’ve maybe once in the last 10 years 
here had what I would refer to something close to an active shooter scenario and that was 
a robber from Kmart who was running leisurely through campus while armed. (A14 
Interview, May 17, 2016)  
This same interviewee recommended having a comprehensive security awareness campaign with 
multiple messaging options:   
It’s got to be multi-faceted.  Any of those things would and could work, right?  
Prioritizing from the top down.  We hit upon this with faculty at new faculty training.  
Because we’re only less than 50% residential now, you can hit the students in the dorms 
but then you’re only getting roughly 32% of your undergraduates so what are you doing 
for the other 68% in the way of pushing messages to them virtually as they’re in their 
places off campus? (A14 Interview, May 17, 2016) 
Communication among Alpha Institution’s entities and partners was a critical best practice.  
Interviewee A8 stated: 
That way partner units that come in to help you.  Everybody’s working on the same page.  
Everybody’s going by the same guidelines.  Everybody knows what their role is based on 
their titles given.  So running NIMS is really important.  Luckily here in the county, we 
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can get on with everybody: Fire, EMS, all the local agencies.  Interagency working 
relationships. (A8 Interview, May 16, 2016)   
No significant cross case synthesis was possible given the lack of information for this interview 
question from Bravo Institution.  
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Table 14 
 
Responses to Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #5: What do you recommend to motivate 
students, staff, or faculty to be more invested in active shooter preparedness (links to research 
question [c])? 
 
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept  Hindrance Recommendation Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
Early student education  Alpha   
Active shooter training by experts    Alpha 
Voluntary opt in notification systems 
have gaps for faculty, staff, etc.  
Alpha    
Comprehensive security plan education 
new faculty  
 Alpha   
Smart classroom emergency 
communications  
  Alpha  
Active shooter training for community, 
open to anyone 
  Alpha  
Twice a month active shooter training 
at the police station  
  Alpha  
Police help security plan development    Alpha  
Monthly digital magazine training 
announcements not effective for 
participation 
 Alpha   
Role assignment for active shooter 
preparedness instills investment in 
safety 
   Bravo 
  
 As noted in a previous interview question, a hindrance to preparedness is the voluntary 
opt in emergency notification system for faculty, staff, and students at Alpha Institution.  Smart 
classrooms were noted as a best practice that allows IHE faculty and staff direct communications 
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in emergency situations.  A significant recommendation was building upon the students’ active 
shooter training they likely received at high schools and before.  A strong best practice was 
inviting community stakeholders and the general public in for active shooter training.  
Additionally, searching out experts, if not already present on campus, to make presentations on 
campus security was a best practice.  Interviewee A9 commented:  
Again, I think getting them while they’re freshman, while they’re more receptive to 
receiving that information would be critical.  And receiving it from someone other than a 
faculty member, perhaps someone who is a police officer.  I don’t think students would 
take it seriously if a faculty member with expertise in Biochemistry is trying to explain to 
them how to react to an active shooter or other forms of emergency preparedness. (A9 
Interview, May 16, 2016)  
No cross case synthesis was available from the data. 
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Table 15 
Responses to Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #6: Do you have any recommended best 
practices for campus security preparedness (links to research question [c])? 
 
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept Hindrance Recommendation Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
New school year faculty training   Alpha   
Active shooter training included in 
faculty retreats  
 Alpha   
Experts give active shooter training  Alpha   
Training by major each year rather than 
every course is more efficient 
 Alpha   
Online training  Alpha   
Active Shooter Training at Annual 
Safety Symposium  
  Alpha  
Symposium varying formats from guest 
speaker to conference style 
  Alpha  
Writing something down    Bravo  
Make plan very accessible    Bravo  
 
 No hindrance or vested theory coding was noted.  The most significant recommendation 
for lessons learned was finding innovative ways to give active shooter training at other faculty 
trainings, retreats, and annual safety symposiums, plus providing incentives for voluntary 
attendance.  Interviewee A10 noted: “That’s where it becomes an issue.  How do you get them to 
do it?  Do you give them a little carrot?  By doing this you get a free coupon to go the donut shop 
or whatever or a coffee.  Which possibly would make sure that they all do it” (A10 Interview, 
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May 16, 2016).  Due to paucity of information from Bravo Institution for this interview question, 
no cross synthesis was possible.  
 
Table 16 
 
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #5: How does your institution 
incorporate after action report lessons learned into updates to the campus security plan (links to 
research question [a])?  
 
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept 
 
Hindrance Recommendation 
Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
Matrix tracking   Alpha  
Assign responsibility for action items   Alpha  
Current US culture has short attention 
span and moves on to the next thing 
Alpha    
Review After Action Reports    Bravo  
Update policies and procedures   Bravo  
Exchange information between 
departments 
  Bravo  
Implementation of real world incidents 
lessons learned  
  Bravo  
Note. This question was moved from Research Question (a) to Research Question (c). 
 
  The short attention span pervasive in our culture is a hindrance, therefore, more 
accountability tools must be developed to ensure campus preparedness activities are executed at 
all IHEs.  No recommendations or vested interest items were noted.  Following the exercise 
lessons learned is a best practice.  Interviewee A11 commented: 
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We review the After Action notes and come up with the After Action improvement 
planning from the AR and identify those points that are in the improvement plan to 
incorporate into the next cycle of planning.  Then we review, train, and exercise again to 
see if improvements have been made. (A11 Interview, May 16, 2016) 
Cross case synthesis showed the tracking of exercise lessons learned by assigning responsibility 
and by using exercise evaluation standards to real world events is a significant best practice.   
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Table 17 
 
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #6: How is ICS incorporated in the 
security planning process and what are any best practices (links to research questions [a-c])? 
 
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept Hindrance Recommendation 
Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
ICS fully implemented   Alpha  
Crisis management under University 
Police 
  Alpha  
Consequence management post active 
shooter incident under other divisions 
  Alpha  
Senior management have more 
difficulty with ICS than first responders 
Alpha    
ICS is sometimes a square peg in a 
round hole 
Bravo    
Participation or join University and 
College Caucus of the International 
Association of Emergency Managers 
 Bravo   
Crisis Management Team engagement 
with Incident Commander issues 
Bravo    
More hands on training   Bravo  
Providing examples of how things can 
happen at the institution 
  Bravo  
Basic ICS training for the President and 
the President’s Cabinet 
 Bravo   
 
A hindrance pointed out by Interviewee A11 at Alpha Institution was that the national 
ICS framework is not always aligned with some state Emergency Support Functions 
frameworks: 
Tactics such as response tactics, is governed through ICS, our emergency operations 
center is through ESF (Emergency Support Functions) and we use 16 ESFs that do not 
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mash up necessarily with FEMA’s ESFs and the detail on that is in the EOP (Emergency 
Operation Plan). (A11 Interview, May 16, 2016)  
 A good recommendation for emergency managers to become more connected to their 
field was to join the University and College Caucus of the International Association of 
Emergency Managers.  Numerous best practices were noted, with a significant one being the use 
of ICS response in lessons learned, as explained by Interviewee A16:  
We actually use ICS in the model as a setup for every department as they set up their 
playbook, whether it be engineering and all their research.  We try to get them to follow 
that whole model of identifying an Incident Commander, making sure you have planning, 
you have logistics. (A16 Interview, June 27, 2016) 
Based on the complexity of decisions they will need to apply and discuss, Interviewee A16 made 
another outstanding recommendation to not rely solely on online training for senior IHE 
administrators.  A16 recommended:  
I don’t believe that you can do the initial online.  I think that you need to talk about.  You 
need to give simple drills when you do it.  Just from experience, I myself felt that just 
going online isn’t always the best way to do these sorts of things and for busy people I 
don’t think online they’re going to pay attention. (A16 Interview, June 27, 2016) 
Cross case synthesis revealed a major hindrance to campus security preparedness (i.e., 
via implementation of exercise lessons learned and planned updates) was a large knowledge gap 
among responders and IHE senior management.    
Research Question (c) summary.  Triangulation of the data revealed that both 
institutions collect and draft exercise after action reports.  The implementation of exercise after 
action report action items were dependent on several factors and varied between the institutions.  
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These factors include the cost to implement the exercise lesson learned item, the feedback 
emergency management staff receive from institutional stakeholders on exercise after action 
reports, and the willingness of senior administrators, deans, and department chairs to discuss 
exercise after action report data, brain storm solutions and updates to the security plan, and 
support new requirements within the security plan.   
 Data analysis indicates that the greatest hindrance across multiple data collection 
methods was the lack of funding to implement lesson learned recommendations and to update the 
campus security plan.  The lack of funding for campus security after action items was directly 
linked to a general level of apathy for involvement in campus preparedness activities from some 
administrators, faculty, staff, and students.  It was recommended that senior administrators 
receive more campus security plan training.  Incentive programs for participation in campus 
security exercises from IHE stakeholders could help increase awareness and commit to updating 
campus security plans.   
 Best practices in implementing exercise lessons learned included using a matrix to track 
exercise lessons learned, assigning responsibility for each action item, and conducting a periodic 
review of action items to ensure accountability for follow-up, whether the administration decides 
to implement or not to implement an item.  Vested interest items were extremely limited for this 
research question.   
Research Question (d) Results  
Research Question (d).  How can the attitudes and behaviors of faculty, staff, and 
administrators consistently be focused on investing in active shooter overall campus 
preparedness?  
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Site documentation review.  As mentioned above, Alpha Institution has had one active 
shooter exercise in the last three years to help get the campus community more invested in 
active shooter preparedness.  Bravo Institution also has had one active shooter exercise in the 
last three years   
 Lessons learned from exercises at Alpha Institution are incorporated into other 
preparedness training activities.  Attitudes of the campus police and emergency management 
staff are very focused on active shooter preparedness.  Alpha Institution conducted an overview 
of campus safety following the TVI at Virginia Tech in 2007.  It was noted that the institution is 
not immune to a TVI like that one.  Alpha Institution will continue to develop a more 
comprehensive approach to student safety.  The current chancellor is committed to increasing 
both the number and variety of emergency drill scenarios in which campus administrators 
practice institutional emergency response protocols.   
At Bravo Institution, lessons learned from exercises are incorporated into other 
preparedness training activities including active shooter training and outreach.  Attitudes of 
Bravo Institution campus police and emergency management staff are also quite focused on 
active shooter preparedness.  Given Bravo Institution’s location in a large metropolitan area, the 
institution also has numerous TVI possibilities, which the campus incorporates into preparedness 
activities.  
Alpha Institution’s active shooter after action report provides lessons learned to help 
focus faculty, staff, and administrators invest in overall campus preparedness.  From the active 
shooter exercise, a spreadsheet appendix was created for a campus improvement plan broken 
down by capability, observation title, areas of improvement, implementation recommendation, 
primary responsible department, start date, completion date, and budget.  As of May 2016, the 
124 
 
campus active shooter exercise improvement plan had not been updated since November 2014 
and none of the 30 plus items requested had been funded per discussion with emergency 
management personnel at Alpha Institution.  Bravo Institution’s after action report for its most 
recent active shooter exercise also provides lessons learned to help focus faculty, staff, and 
administrators investing in overall campus preparedness.   
Observations.  The exercise director’s and controllers’ attitudes and behaviors were 
extremely positive and engaging during the exercise pre-brief, actual exercise, and post exercise 
hot wash.  This enthusiasm was critical to get volunteers, many of whom did not volunteer for 
the role to which the contingency plan exercise had them assigned, to gain interest in the 
exercise.  Besides being positive and engaging, the leadership shown by the exercise director 
gave participants who had minimal knowledge of exercise duties and responsibilities the 
confidence to ask questions, learn, and become more proficient.  
Interviews.  Tables 18-20 contain important themes found from the interview questions 
designed to answer Research Question (d). 
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Table 18 
 
Responses to Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #7: How can the attitudes and behaviors 
of administrators consistently be focused on investing in active shooter overall campus 
preparedness (links to research question [d])? 
 
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept Hindrance Recommendation 
Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
Have to have a plan  Alpha   
People only want training after a TVI Alpha    
Quarterly staff meeting discussion on 
active shooter  
Alpha    
Assigning individual building security 
preparedness liaison as collateral duty 
 Alpha   
Need focus from leadership    Alpha  
Progressive security preparedness 
training at multiple administrative 
positions 
  Alpha  
Progressive security preparedness 
training at Department Chair, Dean, etc. 
  Alpha  
Numerous new senior administrative 
positions unfamiliar with security plan 
Alpha    
Comprehensive Safety Survey   Alpha  
Survey focused on IHE attitudes and 
behaviors  
  Alpha  
Indecision on potentially scaring IHE 
community 
Bravo    
 
A hindrance to IHE stakeholder attitudes is the changeover of new personnel without 
interest in or mandatory training on campus security preparedness.  Furthermore, requests for 
training or attendance at trainings spike after a TVI event at another IHE.  Interviewee A8 noted: 
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“They only want to talk about active shooter when it happens, when it’s the news article, but in 
between news articles it goes away” (A8 Interview,  May 16, 2016).  Interviewee A9 added, “I 
can’t imagine a time where I’ve heard, I could be wrong, any of our administrators from the 
Chancellor on down has ever talked about disaster preparedness” (A9 Interview, May 16, 2016). 
 A noteworthy recommendation was assigning a building security preparedness liaison as 
collateral duty within each IHE building to be responsible for developing building security 
playbooks.  These individual building playbooks would periodically be exercised.  One of the 
most important best practices mentioned was the establishment of progressive security 
preparedness training at multiple administrative positions.  Interviewee A10 recommended:  
When a professor goes from being a professor to say department chair to dean for 
example … usually when they have a dean they have a look, now I’m administration now 
I’m going to move up to be a provost, you know that’s kind of the ladder, usually up to 
maybe the president of the university or chancellor.  I do know that there are workshops 
those people go to.  I don’t know what they are exactly, but they are how to be a dean 
workshop.  At that workshop it would be very important that something like this should 
be covered too at whatever level as you move up through administration. (A10 Interview, 
May 16, 2016) 
No vested interest items were coded.  No significant synthesis between the two cases, all valid 
points.  
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Table 19 
  
Responses to Emergency Managers/Police Interview Question #7:  What would you recommend 
to motivate administrators to be more interested in security preparedness (links to research 
question [d])? 
 
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept Hindrance Recommendation 
Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
Improving preparedness culture  Alpha    
President or Chancellor stating importance 
of security preparedness in speeches, 
training, etc. 
   Alpha 
Constant education    Alpha 
Potential loss of income examples    Bravo 
Practical examples are best motivators     Bravo 
Incentives for exercise volunteers     Bravo 
Little to no budget for emergency 
preparedness, active shooter, etc.  
Bravo    
Establish requirements for faculty to review 
active shooter procedures with students at 
start of semester 
 Bravo   
First lecture of the year each professor 
reviews active shooter preparedness 30 
minutes 
 Bravo   
Faculty are the gatekeepers for students    Bravo  
Personal relationships    Bravo  
Find faculty and staff with previous 
backgrounds in emergency preparedness 
(e.g., Boy Scouts, Volunteer Firefighter)  
   Bravo 
Support education courses     Bravo 
One on one training    Bravo 
Prepare relevant, local, and engaging 
scenarios for active shooter training 
   Bravo 
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Having little to no specific budgets to support campus security preparedness is a 
remarkable hindrance.  This lack of financial support leads to apathy.  Interviewee A11 reported, 
“You’ve got to get rid of the apathy.  You’ve got to make it a priority for them.  To do that, they 
have to relate it to their own lives and own experiences” (A11 Interview, May 16, 2016).  
Another hindrance is that the preparedness culture is relegated to the professionals (i.e., police 
and emergency managers).  Faculty, staff, and administrators are focused on their primary roles 
in academics and other elements of the institution, and rely on others to take care of the security 
issues; however, it is each person’s responsibility to be prepared.  This culture is due to lack of 
accountability for students, faculty, and administrators to be exposed to campus preparedness 
planning, training, engagement, and outreach.  Interviewee A15 added:  
They’ll say, “Oh, we’ve got to plan and we’ve got to do this” then our memory shorts or 
goes away after a fashion until another one happens.  They’re focused on Academics.  
They’re focused on enrollment.  They’re focused on getting the University further down 
the path. (A15 Interview, June 14, 2016) 
 An interviewee recommended the faculty should be required to train students at the 
beginning of the semester.  A best practice is the inclusion of faculty in preparedness when 
possible, as they are the gatekeepers to students.  Vested interest falls with the leader of the 
institution and is key to success.  Interviewee A13 noted: 
I hate to fall back on education, to build that culture … One it’s going to take a senior 
management commitment to say “this is what we’re about and to pay attention to it” so 
one, it has to be an edict from above. (A13 Interview, May 17, 2016) 
 One of the best ways to get vested interest in campus preparedness is to do the research 
and find examples that hit home.  For instance, Interviewee A7 described an incident on campus 
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involving a prolonged power outage in a research building, which resulted in the loss of multiple 
experiments due to inadequate cooling:  “After the lost research grants for $4 million that was 
not renewed because of the loss of research materials, I didn’t have to motivate them.  They 
motivate me” (A7 Interview, March 15, 2016). 
 Cross case synthesis showed consistent engagement with multiple campus stakeholders 
can improve the attitudes of the IHE community.  This relationship between consistent 
engagement and attitude is particularly evident among those who are interested in or who have a 
previous links to preparedness (e.g., Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and volunteer fire fighters) through 
training, symposiums, one on one discussions, and other outreach programs.  
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Table 20 
 
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #8: How can the attitudes and 
behaviors of students, faculty, staff, and administrators consistently be focused on investing in 
active shooter overall campus preparedness (links to research question [d])? 
 
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept Hindrance Recommendation 
Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
Emphasize common sense and basic 
training 
  Alpha  
Reduction in faculty apathy for security 
preparedness  
  Alpha  
Engage with parents over summer 
before students attend orientation 
 Alpha   
Reduction in percentages of blissful 
ignorance or apathy 
   Alpha 
Student Affairs models the way for 
safety to students 
   Alpha 
Seek out guidance from Middle Eastern 
countries with higher terrorism rates 
 Alpha   
Active shooter training a priority for 
faculty orientation  
 Alpha   
Do not overdue training  Bravo   
Active shooter preparedness movie 
education 
 Bravo   
Make training accountability linked to 
student registration, Blackboard, etc. 
 Bravo   
Engagement with Resident Advisor, 
Resident Director, Counseling 
Department 
 Bravo   
Online training for different groups at 
IHEs for active shooter 
 Bravo   
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Opt out system alert warning is 
vulnerability  
Bravo    
Campaign to improve opt out statistics, 
quality of contact information  
 Bravo   
Big events can showcase Emergency 
Management system and benefits  
   Bravo 
Executive level seminars to senior 
management by experts  
   Bravo 
 
The opportunity for faculty, staff, and students to opt out of the emergency notification 
system or not supply their contact information or connecting with the HR system with 
emergency notifications was a significant hindrance and vulnerability.  Interviewee A16 
described the outcry from faculty and staff that they were not notified of a threat on campus: 
So we called IT.  IT went into the system and found out that like 96% of the students 
never opted out, some students did.  But less than 50% of faculty and staff didn’t supply 
their cell numbers.  They on their own didn’t get it because they refused to supply.  So we 
did a campaign.  (A16 Interview, June 27, 2016) 
A notable recommendation within this interview question was the suggestion that U.S. 
IHEs should look to international IHEs at high risk for violence (e.g., Israel) for lessons learned.  
Another good recommendation was to increase the number of IHE staff, faculty, and students 
interested in campus preparedness.  Interviewee A13 commented: 
Is it apathy or ignorance?  They don’t know and they don’t care.  I think it’s blissful 
ignorance.  “You know what, it’s not something I’m worried about.”  I don’t want to say 
all of them.  There are a few that are very invested and committed. (A13 Interview, May 
17, 2016)  
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 It should be noted many faculty do care, but most interviewees concurred faculty interest 
and participation is minimal with regard to campus security.  Communication engagement 
through exercises, security plan development, and preparedness training must be multifaceted, 
effective and properly marketed to administrators, faculty, staff, and students.  Administrators, 
faculty, staff and students must be willing to make campus security preparedness a priority.  
Modeling the way was a significant best practice in campus security preparedness from leaders 
across the campus.  Interviewee A13 noted, “I think it comes from who they view as authority, 
be it the staff, the faculty, the administrators, the Student Affairs staff in particular, that affect so 
many of them, they need to model that this is important” (A13 Interview, May 17, 2016).  
 Executive seminars for senior administrators and a series of training sessions over a 
semester for new faculty or staff were discussed as an excellent tool towards investing in campus 
security preparedness.  Interviewee A13 stated: 
What they’re discussing is rather than doing a two day cram session, they’re basically 
going to require a semester long faculty and staff lunch orientation and what they will do 
is they will meet like every other week or once every other week at lunch for a different 
session.  Instead of having a two day cram session at the beginning, you’ll have a one day 
cram session but then every week once a week, every Thursday at lunch, let’s say, for a 
semester, or even possibly a year, there will be a different topic.  They want to 
incorporate Emergency Preparedness and Safety into one of those. (A13 Interview, May 
17, 2016) 
No significant cross case synthesis was noted between either institutions for the four 
themes.   
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Research Question (d) summary.  Having a robust exercise program which is in 
complete alignment with the HSEEP recommended exercise cycles and plan updates was the 
most significant finding regarding improving invested attitudes and behaviors of faculty, staff, 
and administrators on campus security preparedness.  The next most important factor is 
engagement of senior leadership in campus security planning and exercises for TVI events. 
Campus security preparedness training for active shooter incidents, whether online or in person, 
that use examples that students can connect with, prior incidents, and engaging instructors can 
increase stakeholder investment in preparedness.  Instructor or exercise directors must be 
innovative to engage exercise participants and model the way on why security preparedness is 
important on campus.   
 The greatest overall hindrance to faculty, staff, and administrators to focus on campus 
preparedness is a lack of consistent and dedicated resource support.  TVI exercises require the 
investment of administrators, faculty, and staff to commit the resource time to develop exercise 
scenarios, and attend exercise planning meetings.  Administrators, faculty, and staff have to 
commit the resource time to aiding in the development of an exercise after action report.  
Resource time and potential funding must be allocated to correct exercise after action items. 
Resource time must be given by administrators, faculty, and staff to attend training on new 
security plan updates from each exercise to maintain a maximum level of security preparedness.   
Given the relative infrequency of active shooter incidents at the thousands of IHEs across 
the county, campus emergency management preparedness for TVIs can be an extreme challenge 
with the myriad of campus priorities and government requirements.  One of the most significant 
recommendations to improve attitudes was to incorporate TVI preparedness training with an 
overview of the campus security plan for all administrators, faculty, and staff annually before the 
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start of the new school year.  New administrators, faculty, and staff should be required to attend a 
more in-depth initial campus security preparedness orientation program.  This training should not 
be incorporated with 20 other topics for campus training crammed into a one or two day 
program.  One of the most powerful best practices found to increase attitudes on campus security 
is to have a training program for administrators and senior faculty to increase their 
responsibilities during an active shooter incident.  The most significant vested interest action 
from the data was conducting executive level training seminars for selected senior administrators 
to ensure they are ready to execute the campus security plan during an incident.    
Research Question (e) Results 
Research Question (e).  Would new legislation that centralized federal agency IHE TVI 
security oversight, established across the board requirements for campus security plans and 
exercises, and targeted resource support improve campus preparedness? 
Site documentation review.  After a review of the campus security plans of both Alpha 
Institution and Bravo Institution, it is my professional opinion that additional legislative 
requirements for security plan updates and exercises would facilitate more security plan 
investment by senior leadership, exercise lessons learned implementation, and increase federal 
grant funding of security gaps.  Both Alpha Institution and Bravo Institution have invested 
millions of dollars in campus preparedness training and security initiatives since 2004, 
including emergency call boxes, campus police preparedness, and improved campus 
communication.  Low attendance by faculty, staff, and students at campus preparedness 
activities demonstrates a consistent lack of vested interest at both IHEs.  New legislation and 
increased federal funding to support additional personnel in campus police and emergency 
management has the potential to increase TVI campus outreach and exercise support at both 
135 
 
Alpha Institution and Bravo Institution.  New legislation with associated funding could create 
requirements to monitor institutional exercise after action reports, implementation of after 
action report items, and prioritizing potential federal funding support. 
Observations.  No applicable data were gathered during observations for this research 
question.  
Interviews.  Tables 21-23 contain the relevant themes associated with the interview 
questions designed to answer Research Question (e).  
 
Table 21 
 
Responses to Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #8: Would new legislation that 
centralized federal agency IHE TVI security oversight improve campus security plans and 
exercises (links to research question [e])? 
 
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept Hindrance Recommendation 
Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
Varying policies state to state Alpha    
State institution vs. private institution 
requirements may differ  
Alpha    
Legislation could increase 
accountability security preparedness 
 Alpha   
Fear new legislation requirements 
would mean more unfunded mandates 
Alpha    
Increased partnerships with FEMA, 
DOE, etc. 
 Bravo   
 
Numerous hindrances were identified for developing new legislation, including the 
potential increased burden of creating unfunded mandates.  Interviewee A9 commented: “That’s 
one of the difficulties with a lot of legislation is there are unfunded mandates where it says you 
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need to do this, but by the way figure out a way to do it on your own dime” (A9 Interview, May 
16, 2016). 
 Another hindrance mentioned was potential differences in implementation from state to 
state and private versus public institutions.  Despite the multitude of hindrances addressed, new 
legislation was supported by most interviewees for increased accountability and resources for 
campus security.  A recommendation was the increased use of partnerships between FEMA and 
the Department of Education so campus preparedness had a more focused outreach to IHEs.  No 
best practices or vested interest items were noted.  No cross case synthesis was seen between 
either institutions.  
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Table 22 
 
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #9: Would new legislation that 
centralized federal agency IHE TVI security oversight improve resource support improve 
campus preparedness (links to research question [e])? 
 
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept Hindrance Recommendation 
Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
Effective legislation  Alpha   
Move emergency response from DOE to 
FEMA  
 Alpha   
Example of Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission Exercises run by FEMA 
 Alpha   
Review of which agency emergency 
response fits in the federal government  
 Alpha   
Review how to integrate numerous DOE 
requirements: Clery, Title IX 
 Alpha   
Skepticism over new legislation Alpha    
So many requirements already has led to 
significant confusion  
Alpha    
Review accountability and enforcement 
tools for the Department of Education 
for campus security preparedness 
 Alpha   
Increase funding for training   Bravo   
Move emergency response requirements 
out of DOE, it is not their expertise 
 Bravo   
FEMA should manage IHE emergency 
management funds and grants  
 Bravo   
 
One hindrance to effective legislation is a lack of trust that any new requirements would 
be funded or that funding would be taken away in the future.  A recommendation was for the 
138 
 
Department of Education to send Dear Colleague letters regarding campus preparedness and step 
up enforcement polices of the existing limited requirements and cutting financial aid to 
institutions that do not comply.  No best practices or vested interest items were coded.   
This interview question generated the most cross case synthesis.  Cross case synthesis 
showed both institutions recommend campus emergency management be moved out of the 
Department of Education to FEMA or another more security plan and exercise centered agency.  
Interviewees agreed across the board that the Department of Education lacks the expertise to give 
guidance or hold agencies accountable to more requirements for campus security planning and 
exercises.  Interviewee A11 stated: 
That’s kind of like having teachers tell an emergency manager what needs to be done.  
They’re focusing on how to teach birds.  People know what to do with birds.  That 
doesn’t necessarily transfer very well to teach about active shooters.  You really need to 
move Consequence Management and Emergency Planning underneath FEMA or DHS 
and have an education liaison to be the oversight body for higher education emergency 
management. (A11 Interview, May 16, 2016) 
The same Interviewee, A11, also noted that FEMA is already providing a similar role for the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission: “There’s a reason why the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
does not manage off site Consequence Management.  With the Radiological Emergency 
Preparedness Program FEMA manages the offsite consequence of the REPP program and NRC 
does on plant” (A11 Interview, May 16, 2016).  Another strong comment supporting this 
recommendation was made by Interviewee A16: “They should stay with education.  I think the 
drills and exercises of emergency management belong under FEMA or Department of Homeland 
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Security because that’s what they specialize in.  I think education should stay with education” 
(A16 Interview, June 27, 2016). 
Both institutions made recommendations that any new funding should all be managed by 
another federal agency other than the Department of Education.  Interviewee A16 commented:  
I think the funding should also come through FEMA so it’s focused into the drills and 
response those types of education for the emergency responders who are coming in.  I 
think the Department of Education is branching a little too far out sometimes.  I don’t 
think that’s where their field of expertise should be, it should be in education. (A16 
Interview, June 27, 2016) 
 No data were gathered for Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #9: Is there 
anything else you would like to add regarding active student preparedness (links to research 
questions [a-e])?  None of the interviewees had other comments to provide. 
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Table 23 
 
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #10: Is there anything else you 
would like to add regarding active student preparedness (links to research questions [a-e])? 
 
 Themes 
Key Phrase/Concept Hindrance Recommendation 
Best 
Practice 
Vested 
Interest 
More outreach to student clubs and 
organizations  
 Alpha   
Active shooter are fast events, 
readiness for proper actions is 
important  
 Alpha   
Second tier of required training for 
students to carry weapons on campus  
 Alpha   
Police officers show up on scene with 
active shooter and shoot student or 
staff with weapon (concealed carry 
permit holder) who is engaging with 
active shooter  
Alpha    
Holding a weapon and police show up, 
throw the weapon away from you as 
soon as possible 
  Alpha  
Virginia Tech has record enrollment  
in 2015 
   Bravo 
Emergency Management and 
preparedness is at the end of a chain 
for administrators 
Bravo    
 
A hindrance noted by one interviewee relates to the potential legislation to allow students 
or staff to carry weapons on campus.  If someone with a permit to carry a weapon engages an 
active shooter, the police officers may shoot the wrong individual or both individuals in the 
confusion.  Interviewee A13 explained:   
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“When I arrive on the scene with gun shots I’m probably going to shoot him.” That’s 
what every police officer says, “When I get to the scene and there’s a civilian with a gun, 
I have to assume he’s a bad guy…I have to assume he’s a bad guy and I’m taking him 
out.”  And that’s where they all get really confusing.  Oh, give the students and faculty 
members or the staff the right to carry firearms.  Ok, fine.  Even we have police officers 
say it’s fine, but then they look at you and go, “If I flip on the scene and you got a .357 in 
your hand and there’s some dead bodies on the ground, I’m just as likely to shoot you 
right there and ask questions later.” (A13 Interview, May 16, 2016) 
On the other hand, Interviewee A13 also reported hearing a recommendation in creating 
advanced training requirements for individuals in states and on campuses where concealed carry 
is permitted:   
I had a police officer tell me this past week, “I think if you step up to a higher level,” this 
is an ex-Marine, 15 year veteran of the police force said “I support concealed carry on 
campus.” Without me asking he said “I support it, readily encourage it if there is a second 
tier of training.” (A13 Interview, May 17, 2016) 
 Legislation in support of increased requirements could be hindered by many IHEs and 
other influential congressional groups that have not had a TVI incident on campus.  Interviewee 
A11 stated, “Craig Fugate had a really good quote that he used during the cybersecurity hearing 
with Congress a couple of weeks ago. He said ‘We tend to prepare for what we’ve experienced, 
not what is possible’” (A11 Interview, May 16, 2016).  Interviewee A11 also recommended 
proper training for first responders given the very fast nature of active shooter events:  
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If you look at all the active shooter cases, they are over in five minutes.  From the time 
the first shots are fired to the time the assailant is dead is five minutes.  It was like four 
minutes and 19 seconds at Virginia Tech. (A11 Interview, May 16, 2016)   
More outreach to student clubs was also recommended.  Nothing significant was revealed from 
cross case synthesis of the two institutions.  
Research Question (e) summary.  Triangulation of the data indicates new legislation 
that centralized federal agency IHE TVI security oversight, aligned exercise requirements with 
HSEEP, and increased resource support would improve campus security preparedness.  The 
principal hindrance to new legislation for campus preparedness is the suspicion that government 
would implement these through unfunded mandates.  Already, there are numerous requirements 
to report to the Department of Education for student safety and security.  It was the general belief 
that further requirements or changes to existing ones would further complicate the morass of 
regulatory framework.  Furthermore, transferring oversight of campus security exercises and 
plans from the Department of Education to FEMA or another agency was widely supported.  In 
this framework, similar to what FEMA does for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, IHEs 
would have the federal government exercise experts providing guidance, mentoring, and holding 
IHEs accountable, in conjunction with existing Department of Education requirements linking 
student safety with federal loan support.  Another recommendation was requiring advanced 
training on police protocols and first responder priorities for students, faculty, or staff who are 
allowed to carry weapons on campus.  
Summary  
 The goals of this qualitative collective case study were to discover barriers to IHEs’ 
security preparedness for TVI events with a focus on active shooter incidents and to make 
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recommendations for improvement.  Qualitative data collected for this study were in the form of 
site documentation reviews, observation of an exercise, and interviews with campus personnel.  
The data from the interviews were analyzed with a qualitative data software package, from 
which I identified four themes:  hindrances, recommendations, best practices, and vested 
interests.  The three data types were triangulated and summarized for each of the five research 
questions (a-e).  The major barriers to security preparedness were lack of resource funding for 
dedicated preparedness staff, security planning and exercises; apathy regarding campus security 
preparedness by administrators, staff faculty and students; multiple federal security preparedness 
guides; and the lack of requirements for robust security planning and exercises.  Major 
recommendations identified from the interviews include increased funding for security 
preparedness training, planning, and exercises; IHE senior leadership must model the way; and 
the transfer of IHE campus security preparedness oversight to FEMA.  A more thorough 
discussion of the findings follows in Chapter Five.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION  
Overview 
 The aim of this qualitative collective case study was to identify the barriers to campus 
security preparedness and discover best practices of universities and colleges conducting security 
preparedness activities for a TVI incident (TVI).  Below I have summarized my triangulated 
analysis for each of the five research questions designed to achieve this aim.  Following that, I 
discuss my findings in relation to the existing literature as reviewed in Chapter Two.  Next I will 
discuss the methodological and practical implications for this study, including a large list of 
recommendations regarding oversight, funding, guidance, recommendations targeted to IHEs, 
and recommendations regarding training.  The limitations section lists several potential flaws in 
the design of this study, followed finally by recommendations for future research. 
Summary of Findings 
Research Question (a) 
Research Question (a):  How do institutions integrate federal agency multiyear exercise 
guidance of various types of exercises (workshop/seminar, tabletop, functional, and full scale) 
for the campus security plan? 
Triangulation of the three data types showed that both institutions integrate federal 
agency multiyear exercise guidance in developing different types of exercises for the campus 
security plan.  The HSEEP program, which is run by FEMA, was found in site documentation 
for both institutions, observations for Bravo Institution, and during multiple interviews.  
 The major hindrance to fully implementing the exercise guidance from FEMA is the 
overall lack of funding to support the preparedness cycle.  Numerous recommendations were 
made, including the establishment of a long term exercise plan, and that senior administrators, 
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faculty, staff, and students participate in exercises to the maximum extent possible.  This is even 
more important with the large turnover of students and faculty changes within many IHEs across 
the country.  A significant best practice observed was the integration of the campus security plan 
with other stakeholders that may impact the IHE.  Vested interest in campus exercises must stem 
from a multifaceted approach through security plan training activities before, during, and after 
exercises.  IHE security planning partners who develop individual building playbooks must be 
engaged in the entire exercise campus security plan annually.    
Research Question (b) 
Research Question (b):  How are exercises of the campus security plan measured for 
overall preparedness to respond to a large-scale active shooter incident with multiple student 
injuries and loss of life?   
The campus security plans to respond to a TVI are measured on feedback from exercise 
evaluators, observers, and hot wash items developed from participants after the exercise.  
Participation from administrators, faculty, staff, and students is another method used to measure 
overall preparedness to respond to an active shooter incident.  Participation includes attendance 
metrics at preparedness training sessions in person and online, willingness to volunteer to 
participate in exercises, feedback given after an exercise during a hot wash, and overall 
willingness to implement exercise after action recommended items.   
 The greatest hindrance to preparedness was the overall high level of apathy from campus 
stakeholders.  Several participants of the interview process recommended that measurement 
methods of campus security preparedness be routinely briefed to senior administrators.  Senior 
IHE administrators then must ensure faculty and staff are aware of the negative consequences of 
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being unprepared for a TVI regarding loss of life and significant recovery challenges (e.g., 
Department of Education enforcement penalties, lawsuits) for the IHE.  
A best practice to measure campus security plan preparedness is to consistently review 
the plan by institutional groups with key stakeholders to champion preparedness planning, 
exercises, and training.  For instance, an All Hazards Plan and a Safety Council is in place at 
Alpha Institution, while Bravo Institution utilizes an Enterprise Rick Management Committee.  
These groups review exercise after action reports, determine priorities based on risk, and makes 
recommendations for funding to senior leadership.  Vested interest measurement indicators of 
campus preparedness should center on participation of senior campus administrators and senior 
faculty (e.g., deans, department chairs) in exercises.  These stakeholders then actively engage to 
develop solutions to complicated exercise after action report items. 
Research Question (c) 
Research Question (c):  How are previous TVI exercise lessons used in follow-on 
exercises or updates to a campus security plan?   
While both institutions collect and draft exercise after action reports, the implementation 
of exercise after action report action items were dependent on several factors and varied between 
the institutions.  These factors include the cost to implement the exercise lesson learned items; 
the feedback emergency management staff receive from institutional stakeholders on exercise 
after action reports; and the willingness of senior administrators, deans, and department chairs to 
discuss exercise after action report data, brain storm solutions and updates to the security plan, 
and support new requirements within the security plan.   
 The greatest hindrance to implementing lessons learned in exercises or updates to the 
security plan was the lack of funding.  This lack of funding was directly linked to a general level 
147 
 
of apathy for involvement in campus preparedness activities from some administrators, faculty, 
staff, and students.  It was recommended that senior administrators receive more preparedness 
training to enhance their knowledge base and to promote vested interest.  Incentive programs for 
participation in campus security exercises could help increase awareness and commit to updating 
campus security plans.   
 Best practices in implementing exercise lessons learned included using a matrix to track 
exercise lessons learned, assigning responsibility for each action item, and conducting a periodic 
review of action items to ensure accountability for follow-up, whether the administration decides 
to implement or not to implement an item.  My previous leadership experience and the research 
literature support the concept that engagement and interest from the president, chancellor, and 
other senior administrators is critical to ensuring exercise lessons learned are implemented in the 
campus security plan.    
Research Question (d) 
Research Question (d): How can the attitudes and behaviors of faculty, staff, and 
administrators consistently be focused on investing in active shooter overall campus 
preparedness?  
Having a robust exercise program which is in complete alignment with the HSEEP 
recommended exercise cycles and plan updates was the most significant finding regarding 
improving invested attitudes and behaviors of faculty, staff, and administrators on campus 
security preparedness.  The next most important factor is engagement of senior administrators, 
(e.g., chancellors and presidents) in campus security planning oversight, support, and leadership.  
Campus security preparedness training from engaging instructors using examples people can 
connect with can increase stakeholder investment in preparedness.   
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 The greatest overall hindrance to faculty, staff, and administrators to focus on campus 
preparedness is a lack of consistent and dedicated resource support.  Resource time must be 
afforded by administrators, faculty and staff for all to attend training to maintain a maximum 
level of security preparedness.   
Recommendations to improve attitudes towards preparedness include training for all new 
administrators, faculty, staff, and students during their orientation, and follow up training for 
those not new to the institution.  An innovative best practice found to increase attitudes on 
campus security is to assign roles or duties to administrators and senior faculty to increase their 
responsibilities during a TVI.  These people also receive executive level training seminars to 
ensure they are ready to execute the campus security plan during an incident.    
Research Question (e) 
Research Question (e): Would new legislation that centralized federal agency IHE TVI 
security oversight, established across the board requirements for campus security plans and 
exercises, and targeted resource support improve campus preparedness? 
 Triangulation of the data indicates new legislation that centralized IHE TVI security 
oversight under one federal agency, aligned exercise requirements with HSEEP, and increased 
resource support would improve campus security preparedness.  While there was a general 
consensus that new legislation would be beneficial in theory, in reality most feared it would 
result in more unfunded mandates and add to the confusing morass of existing federal guidance.  
Transferring oversight of campus security exercises and plans from the Department of Education 
to FEMA or another agency was widely supported.  In this framework, similar to what FEMA 
does for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, IHEs would have the federal government exercise 
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experts providing guidance, mentoring, and holding IHEs accountable, in conjunction with 
existing Department of Education requirements linking student safety with federal loan support.   
Discussion 
Throughout this research, my goal was to discover barriers to and best practices for 
improving security preparedness at IHEs.  What I discovered was more than the dichotomy of 
barriers and best practices.  Through my data analysis, I identified four major themes:  
hindrances, recommendations, best practices, and vested interest.  Hindrances generally comprise 
the “barriers,” while recommendations, best practices, and vested interest comprise the 
“recognized excellence in campus preparedness” I conceived of when I began the study.  Many 
of the hindrances to campus security preparedness discovered from participant interviews relate 
to lack of funding for and interest in security preparedness.  Other hindrances include lack of 
federal requirements for preparedness and the glut of confusing federal guidance.  
Recommendations include having one federal guideline for security preparedness and moving 
oversight of IHE security preparedness to another federal agency.  Best practices include having 
IHE senior leadership lead the way when it comes to preparedness and partnering with local 
agencies on their security plans and exercises.  Vested interest begins with the IHE senior 
leadership who can instill these tenets throughout their institutions through example, practice, 
and by making it pertinent to their populations. 
Lack of funding or insufficient funding for IHE security preparedness was one of the 
greatest and most consistent hindrances reported by the interviewees.  Note that these institutions 
both have robust planning and exercise programs.  This finding is consistent with Schafer et al. 
(2010) who found that only 31% of colleges and universities have increased funding for campus 
safety since 2007.  Funding deficits for campus IHE security preparedness have left significant 
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gaps in campus safety.  One of the major recommendations in the Report of the Review to the 
President of the United States three months after the Virginia Tech shooting in 2007 was “Where 
we know what to do, we have to be better at doing it” (Leavitt et al., 2007, p. 16).  Leaders 
clearly know what to do to improve security preparedness on campuses, but without resource 
commitment from IHEs, states, or the federal government, this is impractical.   
Another significant hindrance found in the literature review indicated a general 
disinterest in security preparedness among many IHEs.  Seo et al. (2012) found that only 25% of 
campuses believed their students understood or were prepared to respond to a crisis.  Davis and 
Walker (2005) discussed the lack of focus of faculty and students on campus security 
preparedness, unless impacted by a past TVI or another event across the country.  This sense of 
apathy was echoed throughout the interviews at both institutions, with particular emphasis on 
faculty and student disinterest in preparedness as noted by emergency managers and police 
representatives at both institutions.  The interview data also validated research by Frazzano and 
Snyder (2014) regarding what can happen when instincts and a lack of training for security 
preparedness are the culture of an IHE.  According to Interviewee A8, who is a member of the 
campus police, “We can’t even get them to evacuate the building without going through the front 
exit all the time.  We’re hoping the common sense may kick in, but there’s a general level of 
apathy.  With students, faculty, and staff, it’s not just related to students” (A8 Interview, May 16, 
2016).    
Data from interviews clearly showed a consensus from both case studies that the federal 
guidance documents for security preparedness are confusing and duplicative, creating yet another 
hindrance to preparedness.  For instance, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (2003), 
“Building a Disaster-Resistant University” was one of the first post-Columbine and post 9/11 
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pieces of federal guidance for IHE security preparedness.  Following the disasters left in the 
wakes of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, the U.S. Department of Education (2007) 
published the “Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and 
Communities.”  Note that this was published in January of 2007, before the shootings at Virginia 
Tech.  However, not long after that horrific event, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(2008) published “Active shooter:  How to Respond.”  The U.S. Department of Education (2010) 
published the “Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education.”  
Within the U.S. Department of Education, the Office of Postsecondary Education (2011) 
published the “Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting.”  Two years later, another 
office within the U.S. Department of Education, the Office of Elementary and Secondary 
Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students (2013) published the “Guide for Developing 
High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Institutions of Higher Education.”  The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (2013a) published “Fire/Emergency Medical Services 
Department Operational Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty 
Incidents.”  There is even an online course offered by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (2013b) entitled “IS-360 Preparing for Mass Casualty Incidents: A Guide for Schools, 
Higher Education, and Houses of Worship.”  In 2013, the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (2013c) published what was most cited in the literature and among both institutions as 
the critical tool to security preparedness, the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation 
Program (HSEEP).  Interviewees agreed that the numerous federal agency guidance documents 
were exceedingly confusing and frustrating. 
Interviewees widely recommended the creation of a definitive IHE federal agency 
guidebook on campus security preparedness that consolidates information from the Department 
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of Education, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Secret Service.  However, the lack of federal requirements 
for IHE security preparedness makes this a difficult task.  Furthermore, and more alarmingly, it 
makes IHEs more vulnerable to targeted violence on campus depending on voluntary 
implementation of agency recommendations and their own vested interest in protecting their 
populations.  
While not explicitly discussed in the literature, a majority of interviewees favored 
moving oversight of security preparedness out of the U.S. Department of Education and under 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, or more specifically, FEMA.  The consensus among 
participants was that the DOE does not have the expertise to oversee security preparedness at 
IHEs, but that FEMA does and should be the responsible agency.  What was not consistent was 
the push for new legislation requiring security preparedness at IHEs (i.e., to have a security plan 
for TVIs, exercise the plan, implement lessons learned from exercises into the plan).  While most 
participants were in favor of more preparedness, many were fearful that new legislation would 
entail more unfunded mandates. 
Gaining campus security accreditation from the International Association of Campus Law 
Enforcement Administrators is a relatively inexpensive, efficient, and effective method to 
significantly enhance IHE security preparedness.  According to the International Association of 
Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA; 2015), only a minority of IHEs have 
applied for campus security accreditation.  Neither of the institutions participating in this study 
are accredited by IACLEA, however, one is accredited by the Commission on the Accreditation 
of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) and the other is designated a “Disaster Resistant 
University” by FEMA. 
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Conducting exercises was noted as an extremely important element of campus security 
preparedness by the interviewees and in the literature (Eaker & Viars, 2014; Frazzano & Snyder, 
2014; Han et al., 2015; Jenkins & Goodman, 2015).  However, no regulatory requirements exist 
for IHEs to prepare or train for a TVI.  Both institutions completed exercise after action reports 
and updated their security plans based on lessons learned; however, items requiring funding for 
improving the campus security plan and overall preparedness were difficult to implement based 
on shifting priorities, lack of interest, and limited or no funding support.  
All hazards planning is very important to developing an overall framework for 
emergency preparedness activities (U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and 
Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, 2013).  This was reflected in 
comments from interviewees regarding the importance of preparing for a TVI, but at the same 
time, and perhaps more often, to prepare for other disasters on campus (e.g., fire/explosions at 
research buildings, pandemic events, and natural disasters).  Whether there is a TVI, tornado, or 
fire, people need to be prepared to respond in order to increase survival.  The tactics for an active 
shooter, however, are somewhat different than a fire.  Fire drills are mandated by law, so why are 
active shooter drills not mandated?  Although not required by law, both institutions included in 
this study demonstrated superior best practices and vested interest with regards to all forms of 
emergency preparedness.  That is not to say that either institution has no room for improvement, 
however, budgetary constraints is the primary limiting factor towards that end.  Note that I 
purposefully sampled these two institutions based on their high level of security preparedness.  
Smaller IHEs with smaller budgets and fewer resources may not be as prepared as these two 
institutions.   
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Collaboration between IHEs and federal, state, and local agencies was consistently 
stressed in the interview data as well as in the literature review as a best practice (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2003, 2013a; U.S. Department of Education, Office of 
Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, 2013; U.S. 
Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, 2011).  Interviewees reported they 
partnered with these agencies when possible, but without requirements for periodic meetings or 
formal committees, as are established under the Maritime Transportation Security Act for the 
maritime industry (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013), engagement activities are dependent on institutional 
priorities.   
The importance of IHE senior leadership engagement was noted in The U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security (2015) report noting that college and university presidents and chancellors 
are the single most important factor in campus resilience and emergency planning.  However, 
interviewees from both institutions reported varying levels of participation of senior leadership.   
Vested interest falls with the leader of the institution and is the key to its success (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2015).  Interviewee A13 summed this up very well:  “It’s 
going to take a senior management commitment to say ‘this is what we’re about and to pay 
attention to it’ so one, it has to be an edict from above” (A13 Interview, May 17, 2016).  
Indicators of vested interest in campus preparedness should center on interest from senior 
campus administrators and senior faculty who participate in exercises and ensure exercise lessons 
learned are implemented in the campus security plan.  Furthermore, having a robust exercise 
program which is in alignment with the HSEEP recommended exercise cycles and plan updates 
was a significant finding regarding improving invested attitudes and behaviors of faculty, staff, 
and administrators on campus security preparedness.  Additionally, training provided by 
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engaging instructors who use everyday examples that people can connect with can increase 
stakeholder investment in preparedness.   
The selection of vested interest theory as the theoretical framework for this study has 
proven to be extremely relevant in predicting behavior that will improve overall security at IHEs 
(Miller et al., 2013).  IHEs that have experienced TVIs first hand are intrinsically more vested in 
security preparedness based on the impacts to the IHE and the significant recovery needed by 
administrators, staff, faculty, and students.     
This study bolsters much of the existing literature regarding negligible funding and 
apathy regarding security preparedness, but it also contributes new information regarding 
hindrances (i.e., barriers), best practices, and vested interests to improving security preparedness.  
Furthermore, based on recommendations gleaned from the literature, my data collection, and my 
own professional experience, I provide below many recommendations to enhance security 
preparedness at IHEs. 
Implications 
The theoretical implications of this study validated that vested theory is an appropriate 
research theory for IHE security preparedness.  Major stakeholders that are impacted by this 
study are federal agencies, IHEs (including all campus personnel), and local IHE partners.  Using 
the triangulation method of data analysis of site documentation, observations and interviews, I 
have gleaned a multitude of insightful recommendations, best practices, and vested interests, as 
well as identified significant hindrances.  Below is a list of recommendations designed to 
improve campus security preparedness. 
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Recommendations Regarding Oversight, Guidance, and Funding 
1. A Congressional review should be initiated to determine if moving oversight 
responsibility to another federal entity, such as the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, would improve student safety. 
2. The Department of Education or Congress should consider proposing legislation, similar 
to the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, mandating IHE Security 
Committees, establishing exercise requirements with oversight from FEMA, and adding 
an IHE security specialist at each institution in the country, either private or public, 
regardless of the size.  The chair of the IHE Security Committee would be either the 
president or chancellor of the IHE.  This recommendation is in alignment with the 
HSAAC report, which noted the single most important element in campus security is the 
president or chancellor (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015).  Presidents and 
chancellors would be required to submit an annual report on campus security 
preparedness to FEMA, which would review, and submit a report to Congress annually.  
3. The Department of Education should recommend legislation to establish an IHE Security 
Grant Program, similar to the Port Security Grant Program under the MTSA, that 
provides funding based on risk to IHEs for security preparedness improvements and 
annual training.   
4. The U.S. Department of Education or other agency should establish one overall IHE 
security guidebook.  FEMA would be the best fit for a federal agency to accomplish this 
task given its work with Disaster Resistant University Program and HSEEP oversight.  
The creation of a consolidated campus security guidebook would be extremely beneficial 
to campus security preparedness.    
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Recommendations for IHEs  
1. IHEs should apply for accreditation of its campus security program through IACLEA or 
CALEA.  Accreditation of the campus security program provides third party oversight by 
security planning professionals and greater credibility for student safety.  The IACLEA 
accreditation utilizes 210 standards in collaboration with numerous state law enforcement 
accreditation agencies. 
2. IHEs should have a dedicated campus security preparedness specialist that focuses on 
security plan development, outreach with campus stakeholders, and local emergency 
responders.  The campus security specialist should implement the various phases of 
exercise develop according to HSEEP guidelines.    
3. IHEs should follow HSEEP guidance, which includes developing a five year campus 
security exercise plan that maximizes participation from administrators, staff, faculty, and 
students.  
4. IHEs should follow the ICS protocols that link with local, state, and federal first 
responders.  The president or chancellor should receive Incident Commander training and 
participate in campus security exercises.  
5. IHEs should require all campus personnel (administrators, faculty, staff, and students) to 
register for an emergency notification system.  All who register must provide a phone 
number.   
6. IHEs should establish a safety committee, with membership from administration, staff, 
faculty, and students to review after action reports, determine priorities based on risk, and 
make recommendations for funding to senior leadership. 
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7. IHEs should partner with local community stakeholders such as police, fire, EMS, 
hospitals, etc. to use all available resources for the campus security plan.  
8. IHEs should not rely on a single marketing source to advertise training.  Publish 
information about trainings in campus newspapers (online or print), but also have senior 
leadership (e.g., president, chancellor, provost, deans, department chairs, etc.) send mass 
email to their respective populations advertising training and emphasizing importance of 
training.  Research demonstrates modeling the way from senior leadership improves 
investment in security preparedness. 
9. IHEs should invest in smart classroom emergency notification systems so that the proper 
authorities can be notified immediately in the event of an emergency in the classroom. 
10. Emergency managers at IHEs should consider joining the University and College Caucus 
of International Association of Emergency Managers to stay abreast in their area of 
expertise. 
11. IHEs should register with the list serve for Oregon Disaster Resistant University 
https://lists.uoregon.edu/mailman/listinfo/dru.  Oregon University has taken the lead as a 
Disaster Resistant University to share information among other institutions with the same 
certification on campus emergency management and business continuity.   
Recommendations Regarding Training 
1. Training should be conducted by experts in the field.  For instance, the national training 
program, Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT), is an 
excellent resource to train law enforcement and emergency management professionals in 
security preparedness as well as provides certification so that these individuals can train 
the general campus population.  
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2. IHE senior leadership (e.g., chancellors, provosts, presidents, vice presidents, deans, and 
assistant deans) should complete FEMA’s online course, IS-360 Preparing for TVI 
incidents: A guide for schools, higher education, and houses of worship. 
3. All new campus personnel (administrators, faculty, staff, and students) should be required 
to complete campus preparedness security training.  Employment and/or enrollment 
should be contingent upon completion of this training. 
4. Established campus personnel should be required to complete a brief refresher course 
(online or in person) annually.  Salaries and/or release of grades could be used as a tool 
for gaining compliance.  
5. Campus personnel participating in a training should be instructed on the security plan 
updates before an exercise to maximize the learning potential. 
6. Training should be multifaceted, targeted to each audience, effective, and efficient.  The 
participants will remember it and be less resentful at having been required to do 
something 
7. Trainings should be offered at multiple times, dates, and locations to accommodate a 
multitude of busy schedules. 
8. Do not overdo training!  Too much will be exhausting for everyone involved and lead to 
over saturation, boredom, and further apathy. 
9. Inquire whether campus law enforcement officials are eligible to apply for funding for 
active shooter training under the new POLICE Act of 2016. 
Limitations 
Several limitations were identified in this research study.  First, I encountered difficulty 
accessing targeted interviewees during the scheduled data collection period at the end of the 
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spring term and beginning of the summer term.  Several interviewee targets’ schedules were too 
full to allow for an interview and others were not available via email as they were not teaching 
during the summer term.  Additionally, I was unable to collect observation data for Alpha 
Institution, as no exercise was scheduled during my data collection phase.  Lack of this 
observation data may have impacted a thorough triangulation of the data. 
Purposeful sampling identified institutions from the literature review meeting metrics of 
IHEs with very proactive campus security programs.  Consequently, institutions with very little 
focus on campus security preparedness were not represented in the study.  An examination of 
such an institution could identify additional hindrances, recommendations, best practices, vested 
interests, or something entirely new.  Community colleges were not included as part of the 
research study which could also have unique campus security issues and perspectives.   
Recommendations for Future Research 
Additional qualitative case studies are recommended to further contribute to the body of 
knowledge regarding security at IHEs.  The following is a list of topics recommended for future 
research: 
1. Case studies using the same framework of this study, but that include community 
colleges and IHEs in different locales (e.g., West Coast, Midwest). 
2. Case studies using the same framework of this study, but at IHEs with a lesser emphasis 
on security than what was found with Alpha and Bravo Institutions 
3. Examine the relationship or effect of a robust and proactive mental health and/or 
counseling program and the incidence of TVIs on campus?  
4. Would more guns on campus deter TVIs?  Should anyone with a gun permit, other than 
law enforcement, be allowed to carry a gun on campus?   
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5. What has Virginia Tech, or other IHE that has suffered a mass active shooter event, done 
to recover and improve security preparedness on campus?    
6. A legal analysis of the U.S. Department of Education’s authority to hold IHEs 
accountable for minimum 34 CFR 688.46 requirements would also contribute to the 
research.  Analyze what fines were issued to Virginia Tech and why.  Why were the fines 
overturned?  Is the U.S. Department of Education’s authority to penalize a non-compliant 
IHE too weak, or were other forces at play? 
7. Would FEMA’s Training and Education Division be the best fit as a center for IHE TVI 
preparedness?  Or would it be better for oversight to rest at FEMA’s Regional Offices? 
Summary 
A thorough review of the literature revealed inconsistent and often inadequate security 
preparedness for TVIs at IHEs.  This is not surprising given the lack of federal or state 
requirements to do so.  The aim of this study was to identify barriers to and best practices for 
improving security preparedness for TVIs at IHEs.  Data collection consisted of site 
documentation review, observation of an exercise, and interviews with campus personnel.  I 
identified four themes from the data with regard to campus security preparedness: hindrances, 
recommendations, best practices, and vested interests.  The major barriers to improving security 
preparedness were lack of resource funding for dedicated preparedness staff, security planning 
and exercises; apathy regarding campus security preparedness by administrators, staff, faculty, 
and students; multiple federal security preparedness guides with no clear directive of which one 
should be used; and the lack of federal or state requirements for robust security planning and 
exercises.  Major recommendations identified from the data include increased funding for 
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security preparedness training, planning, and exercises; IHE senior leadership must model the 
way; and the transfer of IHE campus security preparedness oversight from DOE to FEMA.   
The big question is would you want your loved ones to attend or work at an IHE with a 
weak security preparedness program?  TVIs are no longer rare and shocking.  During this 
research study, the number and severity of active shooter events in numerous locations in the    
U.S. and worldwide became so overwhelming I stopped looking into each one.  That was until 
September 28, 2016, when a 14-year-old child gunned down a teacher and three young children 
playing outside at recess at an elementary school near my hometown in South Carolina.  The 
school had conducted an active shooter drill not two days before the incident.  If not for that 
security training and the heroism of a nearby volunteer fire fighter who tackled the shooter, the 
number of injured or dead would likely be much higher.  It is no longer a matter of if, but when 
you or a loved one may be faced with such a scenario.  Thinking it cannot happen to you or 
hoping things work out are not strategies for success.  It is not sufficient to say security 
preparedness is important.  Building vested interest and committed attitudes is a top down 
approach.  Leadership must take proactive steps and make stakeholders engaged and 
accountable, with or without federal mandates.  We owe our students, faculty, and staff the due 
diligence to ensure IHEs can respond successfully to TVIs.     
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APPENDIX A: Dissertation Timeline 
Submit chapters 1-3 to the research consultant 01Nov15 
Edit, make suggestions, return Chapters 1- 3(allow 2 weeks)  
Make revisions and resubmit to chair  
  
Provide Chair with Most Recent Manuscript (Chapters 1-3)  01Dec15 
Edit, make suggestions, return (allow 2 weeks)      
  
Submit chapters 1-3 to committee       18Dec15 
Edit, make suggestions, return Chapters 1- 3(allow 2 weeks)  
Make revisions and resubmit   
Approve to send to research consultant or recycle above process  
  
EDUC 989 Proposal, Spring Term (Semester 1)   
Approve for proposal defense or make additional edits  
  
                     10Jan16 
  
Submit materials to committee for proposal defense (15 minute Power 
Point presentation via GoTo Meeting application), with the following 
slides: Introduction, Abstract, Literature Review, Data Collection, etc. 
10Jan16 
  
Proposal defense         14Jan16 
  
Submit IRB application         15Jan16 
Wait for IRB approval/ suggested revisions (allow at least 1 month)   15Feb16 
  
Execute research/ Collect Data at Bravo School        15Feb-15Apr16 
 
Execute research/Collect Data at Alpha School  
 
15Mar-01Jun16 
EDUC 989 Data Collection, Summer Term (Semester 2)  
  
Data Analysis 01 June  - 01 Aug 16 
  
Submit chapter 4               01Sep16 
Edit, make suggestions, return Chapter 4(allow 2 weeks)  
Make revisions and resubmit   
Approve to send to committee or recycle above process  
  
Submit chapter 5           15Aug16 
Edit, make suggestions, return Chapter 5 (allow 2 weeks)  
Make revisions and resubmit   
Approve to send to committee or recycle above process  
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EDUC 990 Defense, Fall Term  
 
  
Submit chapters 1-5 to committee       01Sep16 
Edit, make suggestions, return Chapters 1- 5(allow 2 weeks)  
Make revisions and resubmit   
Approve to send to research consultant or recycle above process  
  
Submit chapters 1-5 to the research consultant            10Sep16 
Edit, make suggestions, return Chapters 1- 5 (allow 2 weeks)  
Make revisions and resubmit to chair   
Approve for editing or make additional edits  
  
Send to Editor (allow at least 1 month)          17Sep16 
Make all edits suggested by the editor and resubmit to chair  
  
Approve for defense or make additional edits                      1Oct16 
  
Submit materials to committee and other LU staff needed for defense       5Oct16 
  
Dissertation Defense                17Oct16 
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APPENDIX B: Open Ended Interview Questions 
Dean or Assistant Dean of Student Affairs Questions  
1.  Does your institution have a regular program for conducting campus preparedness 
exercises in accordance with the federal agency guidance (links to research question (a))?  
2. What is your role on campus regarding an active shooter incident and the institution 
security plan (links to research question (b))? 
3. Have you ever participated in an active shooter exercise or training (links to research 
question (b))?  
4. What are best practices you have observed from campus active shooter training or 
exercises (links to research question (c))? 
5. What do you recommend to motivate students, staff, or faculty to be more invested in 
active shooter preparedness (links to research question (c))? 
6. Do you have any recommended best practices for campus security preparedness (links 
to research question (c))? 
7. How can the attitudes and behaviors of administrators consistently be focused on 
investing in active shooter overall campus preparedness (links to research question (d))? 
8. Would new legislation that centralized federal agency IHE TVI security oversight 
improve campus security plans and exercises (links to research question (e))? 
9. Is there anything else you would like to add regarding active student preparedness (links to 
research questions (a-e))? 
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Campus Emergency Managers and Senior Police Representative Questions  
1. How does your institution conduct faculty and administrative staff training on the 
security plan (links to research question (a))? 
2. How does your institution involve multiple partners (local emergency management, 
local responders) in the security planning process (links to research question (a))? 
3. Does your institution have a regular program for conducting campus preparedness 
exercises (links to research question (a))? 
4. How does your institution measure the effectiveness of security plan exercises (links to 
research question (b))? 
5. How does your institution incorporate after action report lessons learned into updates to 
the campus security plan (links to research question (a))? 
6. How is ICS incorporated in the security planning process and what are any best 
practices (links to research questions (a-c))? 
7. What would you recommend to motivate administrators to be more interested in 
security preparedness (links to research question (d))? 
8. How can the attitudes and behaviors of students, faculty, staff, and administrators 
consistently be focused on investing in active shooter overall campus preparedness (links 
to research question (d))? 
9. Would new legislation that centralized federal agency IHE TVI security oversight 
improve resource support improve campus preparedness (links to research question (e))? 
10. Is there anything else you would like to add regarding active student preparedness 
(links to research questions (a-e))? 
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APPENDIX C: Interview Protocol  
 
Interview Protocol Project: Campus Security Preparedness  
Time of interview: 
Date: 
Place: 
Interviewer: 
Interviewee: 
Position of the Interviewee: 
 
Questions:  (See Appendix B for questions per type of interview) 
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APPENDIX D: Observation Record 
 
Exercise or Security Planning Meeting Observation Record 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Name: ______________________________________________ 
Date and Time: _______________________________________ 
Subject being Observed: ________________________________ 
Observations of events and behaviors: 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Comments/Summary: 
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APPENDIX E: Liberty University IRB Permission Template 
[This permission request template is provided for your convenience. Recommended information is 
included in italicized brackets. Please select the desired information, remove the italics and brackets, and 
remove the information that does not apply to your research. It may also be necessary to highlight the 
entire document when you have finished making your changes and select a font so that the font will be 
uniform throughout.] 
Date: [Insert Date]  
[Recipient] 
[Title] 
[Company] 
[Address 1]  
[Address 2] 
[Address 3] 
Dear [Recipient]: 
As a graduate student in the [department] at Liberty University, I am conducting 
research as part of the requirements for a[n] [degree]. The title of my research project is [title] 
and the purpose of my research is [purpose].  
I am writing to request your permission to [conduct my research in/at [school 
district/school name, church name, business name, organization name, etc.][utilize your 
membership list to recruit participants for my research][contact members of your 
staff/church/organization to invite them to participate in my research study][access and utilize 
student/staff test data/records]. [Select the appropriate phrase.] 
[Select the appropriate sentence.] Participants will be asked to [go to [webpage] and 
click on the link provided/complete the attached survey/contact me to schedule an 
interview/etc.]. [or] The data will be used to [include explanation here]. Participants will be 
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presented with informed consent information prior to participating. Taking part in this study is 
completely voluntary, and participants are welcome to discontinue participation at any time.  
Thank you for considering my request. If you choose to grant permission, [please 
provide a signed statement on approved letterhead indicating your approval][or][respond by 
email to [researcher’s email address]. [Select the appropriate clause. For education research, 
school/district permission will need to be on approved letterhead with the appropriate 
signature(s)]. 
Sincerely, 
 
 [Your Name] 
[Your Title]  
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APPENDIX F: Liberty University IRB Approval 
 
 
